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Abstract
Due to the complexity and requirements of modern real-time systems, mul-
tiple teams must often work concurrently and independently to develop the
various components of the system. Since a team typically only knows the
dependency relations between the components they wrote and those they di-
rectly use, keeping track of system-wide dependency relations is not possible
for any individual team. To further complicate matters, dependency rela-
tions often change as software components are reﬁned or their interactions
modiﬁed.
Because the robustness of any real-time system hinges on the availability
of essential services in spite of faults and failures in useful but non-essential
components, keeping track of the constantly evolving dependency relations
between the system’s components is crucial. If a system’s designers can-
not ensure that critical services only USE but do not DEPEND ON less
critical components, a seemingly minor fault can propagate along complex
and unforeseen dependency chains and bring down the entire system. There-
fore, automatically tracking and analyzing system-wide dependency relations
given only local dependency information is vital for the development of ro-
bust real-time systems.
This thesis presents Dependency Management Framework (DMF), a uni-
ﬁed theoretical framework and prototype toolkit for dependency manage-
ment in robust real-time systems. To illustrate the usability and scalability
of DMF, we also give several application examples of DMF, with case studies
on a distributed car control testbed and a student-developed ION CubeSat
satellite.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In most applications, all features are not equal: some are critical, some are
important, some are useful, and some are superﬂuous. Giving the existing
technologies, industry can only aﬀord to make critical features highly reliable.
Complex and unknown dependency relations are a key contributor to software
system instability. That is, a seemingly minor fault in a non-critical service
can cascade along dependency chains and bring down the whole system.
There are some high-proﬁle real-world examples where the system fail-
ures have been related to ill-formed dependencies. One of the most famous
examples is in the ﬁeld of avionics. On 4 June 1996, the maiden ﬂight of the
Ariane 5 launcher ended in a failure. Only about 40 seconds after initiation
of the ﬂight sequence, at an altitude of about 3700 m, the launcher veered oﬀ
its ﬂight path, broke up and exploded. Engineers from the Ariane 5 project
teams of CNES and Industry immediately started to investigate the fail-
ure. The most astonishing investigation result is that the root cause fault is
within a reused Ariane 4 software component that is even not required in Ari-
ane 5 [1]. Ariane 5 satellite had reused some software components developed
for Ariane 4 for the inertial reference system. These Ariane 4 software com-
ponents made the following assumption: the horizontal velocity component
will never overﬂow a 16-bit variable. This was true for Ariane 4, but not for
Ariane 5. This triggered self-destruction roughly 40 seconds after the launch
of Ariane 5. A fault in a non-critical, and actually even not required, soft-
ware component had cascaded along dependency chains and brought down
the whole system. If the Ariane 5 system had well-formed dependency, i.e.,
critical components had not depended upon less critical components such as
the reused Ariane 4 software component, this catastrophic failure would not
have ever happened.
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A robust software system is one that guarantees critical system properties
and allows safe exploitation of imperfect but useful components. In safety
critical systems such as ﬂight control, the certiﬁcation process mandates the
veriﬁcation of well formed dependency. That is, critical services will not de-
pend on less critical services. This is typically done by the construction of
hardware and software fault trees ( [36–38]) to show that under the giving
hazard model, faults and failures in less critical components cannot prop-
agate to more critical ones. However, fault trees are event based logical
construction. They are created by manually examining the designs and the
codes 1. While the cost of manually constructing and updating fault trees
is acceptable for slowly changing hardware designs, it is too high for rapidly
changing software unless it is safety critical. As a result, software industry
typically does not maintain software fault trees except when mandated by a
certiﬁcation process.
In the context of robust real-time systems, we present an alternative rea-
soning framework and prototype toolkit to fault trees. This new framework
for software component dependency management is tightly integrated with
software components development. Since the formal veriﬁcation or exhaus-
tive testing are not feasible for many large and complex software components,
the potential failures of similar components in the past must be annotated
and the eﬀects to the rest of the system analyzed 2. As long as developers an-
notate the dependency between their own components and the components
they directly use, our system will generate the system wide software com-
ponent dependency relations from local annotations and capture the impact
of design changes. This allows rapid analysis and comparison of diﬀerent
designs and modiﬁcation from the perspective of robust software designs.
1.2 A conceptual framework
Because of the limitations of what is available to us, we will introduce our
basic concepts and approach using an accessible system, i.e., a vision-based
distributed car control testbed [28], which is an experimental real-time con-
trol system in Prof. Panganamala R. Kumar’s Information Technology Con-
1There are eﬀorts to automatically interpret the UML design or the code and generate
fault trees automatically in [38, 47]. But the challenge has been formidable.
2This is called Pessimistic Annotation Assumption. See Section 2.2.
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Figure 1.1: A Vision-Based Car Control Testbed
vergence Laboratory of University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
As illustrated in Figure 1.1, the testbed has a ﬂeet of autonomously con-
trolled cars following given trajectories. The cars do not have location sen-
sors. Instead, the vision server periodically computes the locations of the
cars using the image of the cars taken by the ceiling-mounted cameras and
then sends them to the location server via Ethernet. The location server
then broadcasts the location information of each car over a 802.11 network,
so that each autonomously controlled car can use it to correct its trajectory
following errors. Control is a periodic real-time activity and each controller
expects periodic updates on the car locations.
Normally, navigation control of a car assumes periodic updates of the
cars’ location information. However, 802.11 network (and Ethernet) cannot
guarantee the timely arrival of packets. The incompatibility between the
aperiodic delivery model of 802.11 network and the periodic control of cars
can be signiﬁcantly lessened by adding a Kalman ﬁlter at each car as illus-
trated by Figure 1.2(b). The Kalman ﬁlter can generate acceptably accurate
periodic location estimations for the controller, as long as there is at least
one successful location update in T seconds. Let p be the desired period of
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location packet delivery to the car controllers. A car can keep going with-
out having to stop as long as there are no more than k consecutive packet
loss, where k = T/p. This example illustrates that the car control fail-
safe stop parameter k is a function of the location packet update period p
and the Kalman ﬁlter delay tolerance T . Fail-safe stop parameter k must
be updated if either location packet update period p or Kalman ﬁlter delay
tolerance T changes. And delay tolerance T must be updated if the dynamics
of the electro-mechanical system of the car is changed or the worst case road
condition is changed. In short, automatically tracking and propagating the
impact of changes in either hardware, software or environmental conditions
are important in robust real-time systems.
We now argue for the importance of tracking fault mappings. From a
criticality perspective, the most critical feature of the car control testbed is
collision avoidance. As long as the the distances between cars are larger than
the uncertainty in cars’ locations, there will be no collision. Car controller
will stop the car if the uncertainty of cars’ locations grows too large (we
call this fail-safe stop). This can be triggered by missing k location packets
in a row. From this perspective, it is permissible for the location server to
have a crash failure as long as it can be restarted within T seconds, but not
location information errors that can lead to car collision. Thus, if the vision
server gets a bad image, it should skip an update to the location server,
and consequently the location server skips an update to the cars, mapping
a potentially serious location-error fault into a tolerable missing-a-packet
fault. Tracking the fault mapping is another important task in dependency
management.
We now turn our attention to the impact of communication protocols.
In a distributed system, it is important to model the failure semantics of
communication protocols. For example, crash and recovery of the vision
server or location server is acceptable by the design. In fact, in the testbed
the upper bound of delay tolerable by Kalman ﬁlter is about 7 seconds.
There is plenty of time for a vision server or location server process to restart
from a failure while the cars keep going. However, if TCP is used for the
communication between vision server and location server, which is the case
of the original design as shown in Figure 1.2(a), the crash and then recovery
of the vision server will lead to the lockup of location server, due to the loss
of previous TCP handlers unless they are checkpointed. This argues the use
4
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Figure 1.2: The Design Changes of the Car Control Testbed
5
of UDP, since TCP semantics oﬀers no advantage except more complexity
and overhead. The design change concerning the TCP/UDP connection and
Kalman ﬁlter is shown in Figure 1.2.
We now argue for the necessity of a formal theoretical framework for de-
pendency management. First, informal notions can lead to confusion and
even errors. For example, some papers simply refer A depends on B as A
calls B. However, A depends on B should actually mean that the correctness
of A depends on the correctness of B, as pointed out by Cristian [16]. Under
this meaning, A calls B does not necessarily imply A depends on B, e.g., if
all the failure of B can be tolerated by A, then the correctness of A does not
depend on the correctness of B. As another example, most dependency man-
agement methods do not discriminate the diﬀerent degrees of dependencies
between components. For example, Cristian [16] deﬁned: A server A depends
on a server B if the correctness of A’s behavior depends on the correctness
of B’s behavior. Some researchers noticed the necessity of discriminating
the dependency strengths. Keller et al. [33] introduced the concept of de-
pendency strength as how strongly the dependent component depends on
the antecedent resource. They classify dependency strength into none, op-
tional, and mandatory. However, they did not provide a further explanation
and formally deﬁned metric of dependency strength, and such an informal
classiﬁcation of dependency strength did not totally clarify the confusion.
For example, in the car control testbed, under the classiﬁcation of [33], the
dependency strengths of car controller on location server are mandatory in
both the original and enhanced design. However, we know that actually the
dependency strength is signiﬁcantly weakened in the enhanced design. In
the original design, the car controller requires strict periodic updates on the
car location from the location server. Thus, any failure in the location server
or in the communication from the sever to the car controller could lead to
the failure of the controller. In the enhanced design, a Kalman ﬁlter was
introduced and this allowed the car controller to be less dependent on the
correctness of the location server, as explained earlier. Therefore, a formal
theoretical framework is deﬁnitely needed in order to clarify the confusions
and eliminate the possible errors introduced by such kind of informal notions.
What’s more, any dependency management toolkit or middleware should
have the capability to compose system wide dependency relations from local
dependency information or annotations. Dependency composition rules are
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thus in need. This calls for a uniﬁed theoretical framework where dependency
and dependency strength are formally deﬁned and dependency composition
rules are formally derived and proved. The formal framework should serve
as a solid theoretical foundation for the dependency management toolkit or
middleware.
In summary, an eﬀective dependency management theory and toolkit is
desired to suﬃciently address the issues we have identiﬁed. The input to the
toolkit will be the annotations of potential residual faults such as packet loss
and server crashes and the fault mappings. However, one may argue that: If
I already know the possible faults/failures, why not eliminate them? First,
certain faults cannot be eliminated, for example, packet loss in a wireless
network. Second, certain residual faults are impractical to remove. For
example, in the location server example, the application logic is reasonably
simple and can be made reliable. But the OS has a resource leaking problem
and needs to be auto-rebooted periodically. Fixing the OS would be just too
large a task for the developers of the car control testbed. Besides, the crash
failure is not safety critical and is recoverable due to the use of Kalman ﬁlter
and fail-safe stop protocol. Third, in practice, it is too costly to prove the
correctness or exhaustively test the codes except when the module is safety
critical. Thus, annotating the potential residual errors and tracking their
impacts is a more viable approach in practice.
1.3 Research challenges
This thesis research consists of two parts: the theoretical framework and the
prototype toolkit. The theoretical framework serves as the solid foundation
of the prototype toolkit, with formal deﬁnitions and theorems. The usage of
DMF prototype toolkit consists of two steps: dependency specification and
dependency query. The users annotate the criticality and failure types of
the components as well as the fault/failure propagation rules across compo-
nent boundaries using DMF’s Dependency Specification Language. DMF will
transform the annotations into an internal representation and integrate them
with the underlying primitives and composition rules. The users can then
perform dependency tracking and reasoning tasks using DMF’s Dependency
Query Commands, which interface with the underlying reasoning engine and
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derive the system wide dependency relations based on the local annotations.
First of all, we claim that just the eﬀort of annotating the criticality,
failure set, and failure propagation rules of a system helps developers to
be more aware of the system’s failure propagation behaviors and be alerted
to some failures or propagations overlooked before. Then, with the aid of
DMF’s Dependency Query Commands, DMF will further assist the devel-
opers in checking whether the system design has well-formed dependencies.
DMF will also help the users to discover the optimal places to enforce fault
tolerance and masking mechanisms to improve the robustness of the system.
In addition, DMF allows developers to examine their system as a whole and
determine which components are interacting and which components can re-
sult in critical failures. This knowledge can then be used to focus debugging
and testing eﬀorts on components in the critical path.
But doing this is not without its own challenges. There are three main
research challenges with respect to dependency management: formalism,
evolvability and scalability. The ﬁrst challenge is a theoretical framework
for dependency management, as argued in last section. Currently there is
a lack of formal theoretical framework for dependency management that
is closely bound with software components. Speciﬁcally, we need a formal
deﬁnition to measure the dependency strength of one component on the other
component. Based on the formal deﬁnition, we should be able to formally
deﬁne both the high-level dependency relationship (A depends on B or not)
and low-level dependency relationship (fault/failure propagation properties)
in a uniﬁed theoretical framework, and be able to derive their composition
rules based on the deﬁnitions. We deal with this challenge by providing a
theoretical framework for dependency management, i.e., Deﬁnition 1-11 and
Theorem 1-6, in Chapter 2.
The second challenge is how to make the prototype toolkit adaptable to
evolving software designs. It is important to note that a tighter binding
between the fault/failure propagation description and the actual system de-
sign is desirable for software systems whose design changes frequently. When
changes are infrequent, e.g., a hardware system, the fault tree analysis is very
eﬀective. However in constantly changing software systems, lack of explicit
binding between the tree structure and the actual system design makes it
hard to keep track design changes. Figure 1.3 shows an example of simpliﬁed
software fault tree representation of location server crashes event for
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Figure 1.3: The Fault Tree for Location Server Crashes
the two designs. When the communication between the vision server and the
location server is implemented using the TCP, a crash of the vision server
process can cause the location server process to lock up even if the vision
server has been recovered. However, using an alternative protocol such as
UDP, the location server process need neither be restarted nor reestablish
the connection. When the component interaction protocol is changed, the
change in failure behavior must be understood and reﬂected to the fault tree
manually. If we have multiple fault trees representing diﬀerent top events,
each of the tree may need to be modiﬁed in a diﬀerent way. One of our
objectives is to keep track of the dependency relations as a function of the
annotated properties of components and their interaction protocols. We deal
with this challenge in Chapter 4, and perform a detailed comparison with
software fault tree analysis ( [37, 38]) in Chapter 6.
The third challenge is the scalability of the prototype toolkit. Modern
real-time systems are often developed concurrently by multiple teams. Each
development team typically only knows and thus is able to annotate the
potential failures and failure propagation properties between the software
components within its own scope. They are also required to understand and
annotate how the failures of the other teams’ components that directly in-
teract with their own components can aﬀect their own components. But
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they are not supposed to know the details of the fault/failure propagations
of components exclusively developed by the other teams. Therefore, hierar-
chical system-wide composition of the local dependency annotations must be
supported in order to guarantee the scalability of our prototype toolkit. This
not only demands hierarchical composition rules in theory, but also demands
the capability of the toolkit to generate system wide dependency relations
from the local annotations of each development team. We deal with this
challenge with Theorem 1-6 in Chapter 2 and brieﬂy discuss the scalability
of our prototype toolkit in Section 5.2.
1.4 Structure of this document
In the following of this thesis, we ﬁrst present the theoretical framework of
our Dependency Management Framework (DMF) in Chapter 2. We then
give a brief overview and a few application examples of the DMF proto-
type toolkit in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, covering the basic features and
advanced features of DMF separately. We perform discussions on several im-
portant topics, such as criticality speciﬁcation, scalability, and evolvability
in Chapter 5. We perform a detailed comparison with the related works in
the area of dependency management and fault analysis in Chapter 6. We
then brieﬂy summarize our current accomplishments and set up the future
research directions in Chapter 7.
Readers who want to see the application examples of DMF early can
skip Chapter 2 and read Chapter 3. After the readers grasp a general idea
of the basic features of DMF, they can either come back to the theory in
Chapter 2 or continue with the advanced features of DMF in Chapter 4. It
is not a prerequisite to fully understand the formal deﬁnitions and theorems
presented in Chapter 2 in order to try out the basic features of DMF.
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Chapter 2
The Theoretical Framework of
DMF
In this chapter, we present the theoretical framework of Dependency Man-
agement Framework. We ﬁrst tailor and extend the failure semantics model
developed for general purpose systems to the failure containment and prop-
agation needs of robust real-time systems in Section 2.1, with the most im-
portant extension being from unparameterized failure semantics to param-
eterized failure semantics. We then come up with the formal deﬁnitions of
failure semantics mapping and dependency strength, and classify dependency
relations into total dependency, partial dependency, and USE in Section 2.2.
The composition rules of dependency relations based on these deﬁnitions
have been derived for low level dependency tracking (fault/failure propaga-
tion between components) in Section 2.3 and high level dependency tracking
(depend/USE relations between components) in Section 2.4. Our objective
is to provide a uniﬁed theoretical framework for dependency management in
robust real-time systems. The deﬁnitions and theorems serve as the theoreti-
cal foundation of the DMF toolkit to be presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter
4.
In our framework, the term component can be deﬁned in diﬀerent lay-
ers or with diﬀerent granularities. For example, it can be deﬁned in the
function/procedure layer, class/module layer, or process/thread layer. The
dependency analysis and reasoning can be performed hierarchically from the
components of lower layers to components of higher layers to guarantee the
scalability of the toolkit. In the logical domain, at the ﬁnest granularity, we
can ﬁrst investigate the fault/failure propagation properties between func-
tions that are used in one functionality module (e.g., class in object-oriented
programming), and derive the failure set of this speciﬁc functionality mod-
ule based on the composition/interaction of these functions. Then in the
execution domain, we can investigate the fault/failure propagation proper-
ties between the functionality modules that are used in one process/thread,
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and derive the failure set of each execution unit, i.e., thread. Finally, we
can investigate the fault/failure propagation properties across process/thread
boundaries, and reason about the robustness of the whole system. In this
hierarchical composition process, functions/classes and processes/threads are
deﬁned as component at diﬀerent stage.
In this chapter, we illustrate the deﬁnitions and theorems with our mo-
tivating example, i.e., the car control testbed, and investigate the failures
and failure propagation properties in the process layer. In Chapter 4, we will
reﬁne the component granularity and come up with the case study in detail.
To make the following presentation clear, when component A synchronously
calls the functions of component B, or asynchronously receives data from
component B through message passing or shared memory, we say component
A receives the service of component B, and component B delivers service to
component A.
2.1 Parameterized failure semantics
In order to understand and eﬃciently deal with failures, failures must be
categorized into failure classes. Cristian oﬀers a failure classiﬁcation that
includes omission, timing, performance, value, and crash [17]. We adopt his
classiﬁcation and tailor it to better suit for robust real-time systems where
timing is a critical consideration.
The deﬁnition of failure semantics in [16] is: If the specification of a server
s prescribes that the failure behaviors likely to be observed by the users of s
should be in failure class X, it is said that s has failure semantics X. We
argue that in order to compare and diﬀerentiate the eﬀect of the same failure
in diﬀerent context, it is very important for failure semantics to capture
more detailed failure conditions. We extend Cristian’s deﬁnition of failure
semantics so that application-speciﬁc information can be encoded into the
speciﬁcation of failure semantics.
For example, in hard real-time systems, omission failure (no service de-
livery) and timing failure (service delivery misses its deadline) have the same
eﬀect for the service receiver component and we will treat them in the same
failure class of DeadlineMiss. For example, in the distributed car control
testbed, if the car controller cannot receive location packet from the location
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server by its periodic deadline, there is a DeadlineMiss failure of the location
server. It does not matter whether the packet is lost during transmission
and will never arrive (omission) or the packet is delayed and will arrive later
(miss deadline).
However, the binary fail/no-fail notion of DeadlineMiss does not fully
capture the properties of robust real-time systems. As shown in Figure 1.2,
a controller in (a) may fail due to one location packet deadline miss, while
another one from (b) may only exhibit acceptable performance degradation
even with several consecutive location packet deadline misses. This implies
the system needs diﬀerent kinds of remedies depending on how the system is
actually aﬀected. Therefore, we further parameterize the DeadlineMiss fail-
ure semantics to encode this information. We denote n consecutive deadline
misses as DeadlineMiss〈n〉.
The performance failures are highly application speciﬁc. For example, in
the car control system, the optimal performance is that the cars strictly follow
the desired trajectories, and no collision occurs. When there is big deviation
between the actual trajectory and desired trajectory, there is a performance
degradation. If there are consecutive deadline misses of the location packet,
the cars may have to stop moving in order to avoid collision since no location
information of the peer cars are available now. The performance is further
degraded or we say there is a control performance failure. More seriously,
if car collision occurs, there is a catastrophic control failure. Therefore,
control performance degradation or failure are application speciﬁc and can
also be encoded with further application-speciﬁc information. For example
TrajectoryError〈Δ〉 denotes the accumulated deviation Δ between actual and
desired trajectories of the cars.
The value failures are also application speciﬁc. For example, in the car
control testbed, if there is deviation between the location information con-
tained in the location packet and the cars’ actual locations, it is a value
error. LocationError〈u〉 denotes a value error u in the location packet, while
LocationError〈u, v〉 denotes any location value error smaller than v and larger
than u. In our framework, we still reserve Value as a key word for general
value failure when no application-speciﬁc information is available or neces-
sary.
As presented in the Recovery-Oriented Computing [43], we regard restart
as a corrective action, rather than an eﬀect. Thus we do not distinguish
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crash failures based on the recovery semantics (e.g. amnesia-crash, partial-
amnesia-crash, etc).
Another important failure class in real-time systems is resource sharing
failure. Here resource includes CPU, memory, and other resources that are
shared by multiple components. For example, if the location server over-
runs its planned real-time budget (worst-case execution time, WCET) but
delivers its packet as speciﬁed by the deadline, there is no corresponding
failure type in the traditional model [17]. But from the real-time computing
perspective, resource consumption failure is an important issue because it
can adversely aﬀect the timing of other tasks sharing the same computing
resource or communication channels.
In a word, we provide suﬃcient support for the general failure semantics,
as well as failure semantics typical in robust real-time systems. Both the
user-deﬁned and system-deﬁned failure semantics can be further parameter-
ized with application-speciﬁc information during the dependency speciﬁca-
tion and tracking process.
Deﬁnition 1: The failure semantics of component A is the set of all the
observable failure behaviors of the service delivered by component A, denoted
as FSA.
For example, suppose the location server of the distributed car control
testbed has failure semantics:
FSLS = {DeadlineMiss〈5〉}
⋃{LocationError〈0, 20〉}⋃{Crash}.
It denotes that the location server may fail to timely broadcast periodic
location information to the car controllers for up to ﬁve consecutive periods,
or broadcast the wrong location information deviated from the actual car
location for up to 20 distance units. The location server may crash, too.
The failure semantics of the composition of several components is deﬁned
as:
Deﬁnition 2: The composition of components A1, A2, ..., AN is denoted
as A1
⊕
A2
⊕
...
⊕
AN . Its failure semantics is the Cartesian product FSA1×
FSA2 × ...× FSAN .
We manipulate dependency tracking and reasoning from the perspective
of failure semantics mapping and propagation. The measure of dependency
strength is thus based on the measure of failure semantics strength. The
strength of failure semantics is deﬁned in [17] as: The A/B failure seman-
tics is weaker than A because A/B allows more failure behaviors than A.
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Conversely, A is a stronger failure semantics than A/B. Presented in a more
formal way, the relative strength of failure semantics can be deﬁned using
the inclusion relation between sets, e.g, {A} ⊂ {A,B}. This idea is extended
in our parameterized failure semantics.
Deﬁnition 3: Given two sets of failure semantics FS and FS
′
, if FS ⊂
FS
′
, we say that FS is stronger than FS
′
, and conversely FS
′
is weaker than
FS.
Note that our deﬁnition is a natural extension of Cristian’s deﬁnition
which is based upon unparameterized failure semantics. Actually, if we do
not encode application-dependent failure information into our speciﬁcation
of failure semantics, i.e., we only consider the general failure classes of com-
ponents, then we can represent any speciﬁc failure semantics with a singleton
set, e.g., {V alue}, {T iming}, {Crash}, thus we can have Cristian’s deﬁnition
of failure semantics strength.
Our failure semantics strength deﬁnition greatly extends Cristian’s work.
Say FS = {DeadlineMiss〈3〉}⋃{Crash}, FS′ = {DeadlineMiss〈5〉}⋃{Crash}.
FS is a stronger failure semantics than FS
′
, because consecutive Deadline-
Miss failure for up to 3 periods is a subset of consecutive DeadlineMiss fail-
ure for up to 5 periods. It is harder to ensure the former than the latter.
Cristian’s approach did not diﬀerentiate the strengths of these two failure
semantics. The reason while ours can diﬀerentiate them is that we support
the speciﬁcation and comparison of parameterized failure semantics.
It should be pointed out that not all failure semantics pairs can be
compared in terms of strength. For example, the two failure semantics
FS = {DeadlineMiss〈5〉}, FS′ = {Crash}. In order to compare the strengths
of these two failure semantics, application-speciﬁc weight should be assigned
to each failure class to measure its potential impact on the robustness of the
whole system. The further discussion is out of the scope of this thesis.
2.2 Dependency strength and classiﬁcation
of dependency relations
In this section, we only consider pairwise component dependency, i.e., only
two components A and B are considered, and A receives the service directly
delivered by B. In Section 2.3 and Section 2.4, we will go beyond pairwise
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component dependency and derive dependency composition rules for various
component interaction patterns.
Most dependency management methods do not discriminate the diﬀerent
degrees of dependencies between components. For example, Cristian [16] de-
ﬁned: A server A depends on a server B if the correctness of A’s behavior
depends on the correctness of B’s behavior. Some researchers noticed the
necessity of discriminating the dependency strengths. Keller et al. [33] in-
troduced the concept of dependency strength as how strongly the dependent
component depends on the antecedent resource. They classify dependency
strength into none, optional, and mandatory. However, they do not provide a
further explanation and formally deﬁned metric of dependency strength, and
such an informal classiﬁcation of dependency strength was not be eﬀectively
useful in evaluating the dependency relations of diﬀerent designs. For exam-
ple, in the car control testbed, under the classiﬁcation of [33], the dependency
strengths of car controller on location server are mandatory in both the orig-
inal and enhanced design. However, we know that actually the dependency
strength is signiﬁcantly weakened in the new design. This is because more
failures of the location server can be tolerated by the car controller, thus the
correctness of car controller is less dependent on the correctness of location
server. As a comparison, our classiﬁcation of dependency strength is based
on a formally deﬁned metric in view of failure semantics mapping and can
be eﬀectively applied in dependency relation evaluation concerning design
changes.
We begin with the notion of failure semantics mapping. When com-
ponent A receives the service delivered by component B, a speciﬁc failure
semantics FSSB (a nonempty subset of the failure semantics FSB) of com-
ponent B may introduce a speciﬁc failure semantics FSS
′
A to component A
if the failure behaviors speciﬁed in FSSB cannot be properly masked or tol-
erated by component A. On the contrary, if component A can tolerate all
the failure behaviors speciﬁed in FSSB, no failure behaviors speciﬁed in FS
S
B
will introduce failure to component A. Intuitively, the dependency strength
of component A on component B is stronger in the former case than in the
latter case, because the correctness of component A is less inﬂuenced by the
failures of component B in the latter case.
We capture this observation with the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 4: Assume that component A will function correctly if all the
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services received by A is correct. In addition, assume that all services received
by A is correct except for the service of component B. If a specific failure
semantics FSS
′
A ⊆ FSA may be introduced to component A by the failures
specified in FSSB ⊆ FSB of component B when the service of component B is
delivered to component A, we say that FSSB is mapped to FS
S
′
A in this service
delivery, denoted as map(FSSB, B,A) = FS
S
′
A .
Trivially, the normal (i.e., no failure) functional semantics of compo-
nent B is mapped to the normal functional semantics of component A, i.e.,
map(∅B , B,A) = ∅A. This is obvious if the two assumptions of Deﬁnition 4 are
noticed. This observation is also based on the following general assumption
in our framework.
Pessimistic Annotation Assumption: In our framework, we assume
that pessimistic fault annotations are used. If we cannot verify a component
is correct, we should annotate the potential faults. Similarly, if we cannot
verify whether a fault of component B will incur fault to component A through
service delivery, we should annotate the potential fault propagations.
Suppose that component B delivers service to component A. If component
A will fail for any faulty service delivered by component B, we say that
component A totally depends on component B. If component A can function
correctly in spite of all possible faults in component B, we say that component
A USE component B. Note that the capitalized USE is a key word in our
formal model.
What if component A can only tolerate a subset of component B’s faults?
We measure the strength of the dependency by the size of the subset of B’s
faults that A can tolerate. The larger the subset, the weaker is the depen-
dency. These concepts are deﬁned based on the notion of failure semantics
mapping as follows.
Deﬁnition 5: The dependency strength of component A on component
B is measured by the largest subset FSSB of component B’s failure semantics
FSB such that map(FSSB , B,A) = ∅A.
The intuition is: the stronger (i.e., smaller subset) the failure semantics
FSSB is, the larger its complement set FS
S
B with respect to FSB, which implies
more failure behaviors of component B that cannot be tolerated by compo-
nent A, thus the higher probability that a failure in B leads to a failure in
A, therefore the stronger the correctness of component A depends on the
correctness of component B.
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Based on this deﬁnition, we can categorize the dependency relations be-
tween two components into three classes from a high level perspective. For
example, suppose the failure semantics of location server (LS) FSLS is the
same as what is given in last section’s example.
FSLS = {DeadlineMiss〈5〉}
⋃{LocationError〈0, 20〉}⋃{Crash}.
The car controllers (CC) receives the data service (i.e., location informa-
tion) delivered by the location server. If car controller directly makes use of
location server’s service without dealing with any of location server’s possible
failure behaviors as speciﬁed in FSLS (as illustrated in Figure 1.2-a), then
for any nonempty subset FSSLS of FSLS, we have map(FS
S
LS, LS, CC) 
= ∅,
thus the dependency of controller on location server is measured by ∅. In
this situation, we say that car controller is totally dependent on location
server, meaning if location server fails, car controller fails.
Deﬁnition 6: Component A is totally dependent on component B if the
dependency strength of component A on component B is measured by ∅B 1.
We denote this as TDep(A,B).
By installing a Kalman ﬁlter at the sites of car controllers (as illustrated
in Figure 1.2-b), the Kalman ﬁlter can produce suﬃciently accurate loca-
tion estimations at periodic intervals to the car controller, when up to k
(suppose k = 3) location packets are delayed or lost. What’s more, when
the location server crashes, if it can be recovered within the time period of
Kalman ﬁlter delay tolerance, the car controllers will not even notice such a
crash failure of the location server. Now we have a nonempty proper subset
FSSLS = {DeadlineMiss〈3〉}
⋃{Crash} such that map(FSSLS, LS,CC) = ∅. In
other words, the dependency of car controller on location server is measured by a
non-empty proper subset FSSLS of FSLS. We say that car controller is partially
dependent on location server.
Definition 7: Component A is partially dependent on component B if the
dependency strength of component A on component B is measured by a non-empty
proper subset of FSB. We denote this as PDep(A,B).
Definition 8: Total dependency and partial dependency are collectively called
dependency, denoted as Dep(A,B), that is Dep(A,B) = TDep(A,B)
∨
PDep(A,B).
If all the possible failures of a component B can be tolerated by component A,
that is, even if component B fails, component A still works normally, we say that
component A USE component B.
1As in Deﬁnition 5, by dependency strength measure ∅B, we denote that no failure of
component B can be tolerated by component A.
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Definition 9: Component A USE component B if the dependency strength of
component A on component B is measured by FSB. We denote this as USE(A,B).
From Deﬁnition 5-9, we see that the high level dependency relation (total
dependency/partial dependency/USE) is an abstraction (zoom out) of the low level
dependency relation (failure semantics mapping), while the low level dependency
relation is an elaboration (zoom in) of the high level dependency relation.
As argued in Chapter 1, the most important system robustness criterion is that
critical components should only USE instead of depend on less critical ones. From
the fault propagation perspective, this implies that none of the failures of the less
critical components should be propagated, either directly or indirectly, to critical
components. We have the following deﬁnition.
Definition 10: If a critical component A totally or partially depends on a less
critical component B, we say that a dependency inversion occurs in the system.
Definition 11: A system has well-formed dependencies if no dependency in-
version occurs in the system; otherwise, the system has ill-formed dependencies.
2.3 Low level dependency tracking – failure
semantics mapping and reasoning
Dependency tracking can be done at diﬀerent levels. A high level tracking of USE,
partial and total dependency allows us to quickly determine if the dependency
relation is consistent with the criticality ordering between components. That is,
whether the critical components only USE instead of depend on less critical compo-
nents. If this observation holds, the system design has well-formed dependencies,
otherwise, the dependencies of the system design is ill-formed. A low level track-
ing of the failure semantics propagation across component boundaries quantiﬁes
the nature of the dependency relation from a fault propagation perspective, and
enables us to reason about how faults/failures of a software component may or
may not aﬀect other interacting components.
Our DMF prototype toolkit supports both low level and high level dependency
tracking. The composition rules derived in this section and next section serve as
the theoretical foundation for the dependency tracking facilities of the prototype
toolkit.
2.3.1 The transitive failure semantics mapping
In this section. we ﬁrst present the composition rules for low level dependency
tracking in DMF. We will come to the composition rules for high level dependency
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tracking in next section.
Theorem 1 – Failure semantics mapping rule 1:
• map(FSS1A , A,B) ⊆ map(FSS2A , A,B) if FSS1A ⊆ FSS2A
• map(FSS1A , A,B)
⋃
map(FSS2A , A,B) ⊆ map(FSS1A
⋃
FSS2A , A,B)
Proof. The ﬁrst rule is straightforward based on Deﬁnition 4. Since FSS1A ⊆ FSS2A ,
the failure semantics that may be introduced to component B by the failures
speciﬁed in FSS1A is, of course, a subset of the failure semantics that may be
introduced to component B by the failures speciﬁed in FSS2A . Thus we have
map(FSS1A , A,B) ⊆ map(FSS2A , A,B) based on the deﬁnition of map.
With respect to the second rule, it should be emphasized that the relation is ⊆
instead of =. This is because a certain failure F 1A in subset FS
S1
A combined with a
certain failure F 2A in subset FS
S2
A may lead to a certain failure F
new
B that cannot
be found in either map(FSS1A , A,B) or map(FS
S2
A , A,B). This is because from
Deﬁnition 4, map(FSS1A , A,B) only contains the failures that may be introduced to
component B assuming component A only has failures speciﬁed in FSS1A , and thus
assuming that no failures speciﬁed in FSS2A will ever occur in this service delivery
if FSS1A and FS
S2
A are disjoint. The same argument applies to map(FS
S2
A , A,B).
Thus we have map(FSS1A , A,B)
⋃
map(FSS2A , A,B) ⊆ map(FSS1A
⋃
FSS2A , A,B).
These two rules are very important although they can easily be obtained from
Deﬁnition 4. If the failure semantics mapping for each of component A’s ba-
sic failure types (i.e., DeadlineMiss〈n〉, LocationError〈u, v〉, Crash, etc) has been
speciﬁed, and the failure semantics mapping for each eﬀective combination of the
basic failure types has been speciﬁed, then the failure semantics mapping for any
subset of the failure semantics FSA can thus be obtained by proper set union op-
erations. Here, an eﬀective combination of the basic failure types is a combination
that can lead to new failures of component B that cannot be found in any of the
mappings of component A’s single basic failure types.
In addition to the simple pairwise components scenario that the service of
component C is directly delivered to component A, a slightly more complicated
interaction pattern between two components is: the service of component C is in-
directly delivered to component A through a component B, i.e, the service delivery
path is A← B ← C. We have the following rule for this composition pattern.
Theorem 2 – Failure semantics mapping rule 2:
• map(FSSC , C,B) = FSS
′
B
∧
map(FSS
′
B , B,A) = FS
S
′′
A
⇒ map(FSSC , C,A) = FSS
′′
A
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Proof. This is easy to prove based on the deﬁnition of map. Keep in mind that in
this theorem, we assume that the service delivery path is simply A← B ← C, i.e.,
there is no direct service delivery from component C to component A (or they are
not immediately interacting components).
The most complicated interaction pattern between two components A and
C is that: A directly receives the service of component C, as well as indirectly
receives the service of component C through components B1, B2, ..., BN , which
immediately interact with component A. That is, the service delivery paths are:
A← C, A← Bi ← ...← C (i = 1, ..., N). We have the following composition rule:
Theorem 3 – Failure semantics mapping rule 3:
Suppose along the service delivery path A ← Bi ← ... ← C (denote i = 0 in
case A← C), a speciﬁc failure semantics FSSC is transitively mapped to FS
S
′
i
A , i.e.,
map(FSSC , C,A) = FS
S
′
i
A is obtained along the i-th service delivery path from com-
ponent C to component A. We have map(FSSC , C,A) = FS
S
′
0
A
⋃
FS
S
′
1
A
⋃
...
⋃
FS
S
′
N
A .
Proof. This theorem can be proved based upon Theorem 2 and Deﬁnition 4.
It is worthwhile to point out that the above Three Failure Semantics Map-
ping Rules, although seemingly a little trivial, enable the scalability of the whole
failure semantics mapping reasoning system. Only the failure semantics mappings
between immediately interacting components need to be speciﬁed. What’s more,
only failure semantics mappings regarding the basic failure types and their eﬀec-
tive combinations are required 2. A global picture of failure semantics mappings
can be composed from the local speciﬁcations of failure semantics mapping based
on the three failure semantics mapping rules.
2.3.2 The hierarchical failure semantics mapping
When the failure semantics mapping is to be hierarchically composed, i.e., when we
want to derive the failure semantics of a component (e.g., a functionality module)
from the failure semantics of its lower-level subcomponents (e.g., functions), more
complex composition rules should be supported. Generally, we should be able to
support the following speciﬁcation: When the failure semantics of subcomponents
A1, A2, ..., AN make a certain boolean expression true, component A will exhibit
failure semantics FASA.
2As stated above, a combination of the basic failure types is an eﬀective combination
if it can lead to new failures of the service receiving component that cannot be found in
any of the mappings of the service delivering component’s single basic failure types.
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For example, in the commonly used majority voting method, k out of N im-
plies that the service of component A will be correctly delivered only if k out of
the N subcomponents Ai behave correctly. For example, suppose three diﬀerent
functions are implemented to realize the same algorithm, and they only have value
failure semantics, i.e., their only possible failure is returning the wrong result.
The functionality module A compares the results returned by the three functions,
and performs a majority voting to deliver the ﬁnal result to the component that
invokes this algorithm. This is a typical 2 out 3 composition. In our failure se-
mantics mapping terminology, they are expressed as: (A1.{V alue} ∧A2.{V alue})
∨ (A2.{V alue} ∧ A3.{V alue}) ∨ (A1.{V alue} ∧ A3.{V alue}) ∨ (A1.{V alue} ∧
A2.{V alue} ∧A3.{V alue}) ⇒ A.{V alue}
Notice that any boolean expression can be transformed to a canonical disjunc-
tive form similar to the above expression, therefore, any failure semantics mapping
rule with complex boolean expression can be decomposed to several failure seman-
tics mapping rules with only conjunctive boolean expressions.
A1.{V alue} ∧A2.{V alue} ⇒ A.{V alue}
A2.{V alue} ∧A3.{V alue} ⇒ A.{V alue}
A1.{V alue} ∧A3.{V alue} ⇒ A.{V alue}
A1.{V alue} ∧A2.{V alue} ∧A3.{V alue} ⇒ A.{V alue}
We can denote them using our map formalism as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 4:
map(({V alue}, {V alue}, {}), A1
⊕
A2
⊕
A3, A) = {V alue}
map(({}, {V alue}, {V alue}), A1
⊕
A2
⊕
A3, A) = {V alue}
map(({V alue}, {}, {V alue}), A1
⊕
A2
⊕
A3, A) = {V alue}
map(({V alue}, {V alue}, {V alue}), A1
⊕
A2
⊕
A3, A) = {V alue}
Notice that ({V alue}, {V alue}, {}), etc are elements of the failure semantics
of the composition of these three subcomponents A1
⊕
A2
⊕
A3, as deﬁned in
Deﬁnition 2.
2.4 High level dependency tracking –
depend/use relation propagation and
reasoning
In this section. we present the high level dependency composition rules in DMF,
which gives the composition rules of total dependency, partial dependency, and
USE relations beyond pairwise component dependency.
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2.4.1 The transitive dependency relation propagation
As in Section 2.3, we start with the interaction pattern that the service of compo-
nent C is indirectly delivered to component A through a component B.
Theorem 4 – Dependency relation propagation rule 1:
• TDep(A,B)∧TDep(B,C)⇒ TDep(A,C)
• TDep(A,B)∧PDep(B,C)⇒ PDep(A,C)
• PDep(A,B)∧TDep(B,C)⇒ PDep(A,C)
• PDep(A,B)∧PDep(B,C) ⇒ PDep(A,C)∨USE(A,C)
• Dep(A,B)∧USE(B,C) ⇒ USE(A,C)
• USE(A,B)∧Dep(B,C) ⇒ USE(A,C)
• USE(A,B)∧USE(B,C) ⇒ USE(A,C)
Proof. This can be proved based on the deﬁnition of total dependency, partial
dependency, and USE, as presented in Deﬁnition 6-9. We only prove the fourth
rule here. The other rules can be proved in the same way.
Recall that TDep(A,B) res. PDep(A,B) res. USE(A,B) implies that none
res. a nonempty proper subset res. all of the failure semantics FSB of component
B is mapped to the normal (i.e., no failure) functional semantics of component A.
Suppose the dependency strength of component B on component C is mea-
sured by FSSC , i.e., FS
S
C is the largest subset of FSC such that map(FS
S
C , C,B) =
∅B . We assume that FSSC is mapped to FSS
′
1
B , a nonempty subset of FSB.
That is, we have map(FSSC , C,B) = FS
S
′
1
B . Similarly, suppose the dependency
strength of component A on component B is measured by FSS
′
2
B . We assume that
map(FSS
′
2
B , B,A) = FS
S
′′
A , where FS
S
′′
A is a nonempty subset of FSA.
If FSS
′
1
B
⋂
FS
S
′
2
B 
= ∅, a nonempty set FSS
∗
C ⊆ FSSC ⊂ FSC is mapped to a
nonempty set FSS
′
1
B
⋂
FS
S
′
2
B ⊆ FS
S
′
1
B . And the nonempty set FS
S
′
1
B
⋂
FS
S
′
2
B ⊆ FS
S
′
2
B
is mapped to a nonempty set map(FSS
′
1
B
⋂
FS
S
′
2
B , B,A) ⊆ map(FS
S
′
2
B , B,A) =
FSS
′′
A ⊆ FSA. That is, FSS
∗
C , a nonempty proper subset of FSC , is transitively
mapped to a nonempty subset of FSA, and FSS
∗
C is transitively mapped to the
normal (i.e., no failure) functional semantics of component A. In other words, the
dependency strength of component A on component C can be measured by FSS∗C ,
a nonempty proper subset of FSC . Thus we have PDep(A,C).
If FSS
′
1
B
⋂
FS
S
′
2
B = ∅, the above argument is invalid, and we know that all the
failure semantics of component C is transitively mapped to the normal (i.e., no
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failure) functional semantics of component A. That is, the dependency strength of
component A on component C is measured by FSC . Thus we have USE(A,C).
Therefore we have PDep(A,B)
∧
PDep(B,C) ⇒ PDep(A,C)∨USE(A,C).
Let’s continue to consider the most complicated interaction pattern between
two components A and C: A directly receives the service of component C, as well
as indirectly receives the service of component C through components B1, B2, ...,
BN , which immediately interact with component A.
Theorem 5 – Dependency relation propagation rule 2:
USE(A,C) is true if and only if along all the service delivery paths, USE(A,C)
can be derived. Otherwise, Dep(A,C) is true. Further, suppose for the service
delivery path A ← Bi ← ... ← C (denote i = 0 in case A ← C), the de-
pendency strength measurement of component A on component C is FSSiC , i.e.,
map(FSSiC , C,A) = ∅A is obtained along the i-th service delivery path from compo-
nent C to component A. If
⋃
FSSiC = FSC , then we have TDep(A,C); otherwise
we have PDep(A,C).
Proof. Notice that the failure semantics of component C speciﬁed in FSSiC will be
transitively mapped to a nonempty subset of FSA. If the union of FSSiC equals
FSC , this implies that taking all the service delivery paths into account, none
of the failure semantics FSC is ﬁnally mapped to the normal (i.e., no failure)
functional semantics of component A. In other words, the dependency strength of
component A on component C is measured by ∅C . Thus, we have TDep(A,C).
The partial dependency and USE scenario can be proved in the same way.
2.4.2 The hierarchical dependency relation
propagation
We now consider the depend/USE relation propagation in complex boolean com-
positions. As argued in Section 2.3.2, any failure semantics mapping rule with
complex boolean expression can be decomposed to several failure semantics map-
ping rules with only conjunctive boolean expressions.
It is simple for the disjunctive scenario, i.e., the eﬀect of subcomponent Ai’s
failure on component A is independent with the other subcomponents. In this sce-
nario, the dependency relation of component A on the composition of components
Ai (i = 1, ..., N) is just the strongest among the dependency relations of compo-
nent A on each subcomponent Ai. For example, if component A totally depends
on subcomponent A1, then it totally depends on the composition, no matter what
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are the dependency relations of component A on the other subcomponents. If the
dependency relation of component A on each and every subcomponent Ai is USE,
then it USE the composition.
But for conjunctive scenario, things are much more complicated. Take the k
out of N majority voting method for example. In this scenario, we can not say
that A depends on any subcomponent Ai, since even if this particular Ai fails,
the service can still be properly delivered by component A provided that k out
of the remaining N − 1 subcomponents do not fail. But can we say that A USE
Ai? That is, A USE A1, A USE A2, ..., A USE AN , and thus conclude that A
USE all the subcomponents A1 through AN? No, because in order to ensure A
working correctly, the N subcomponents cannot fail simultaneously. Otherwise,
A will fail. Thus it is not appropriate to say that A USE all the subcomponents,
either. Actually, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 6 – Dependency relation propagation rule 3:
• TDep(A,A1)
∧
TDep(A,A2) ⇒ TDep(A,A1
⊕
A2)
• TDep(A,A1)
∧
PDep(A,A2)⇒ TDep(A,A1
⊕
A2)
• PDep(A,A1)
∧
PDep(A,A2)⇒ Dep(A,A1
⊕
A2)
• TDep(A,A1)
∧
USE(A,A2) ⇒ TDep(A,A1
⊕
A2)
• PDep(A,A1)
∧
USE(A,A2) ⇒ Dep(A,A1
⊕
A2)
• USE(A,A1)
∧
USE(A,A2) ⇒ Dep(A,A1
⊕
A2)
∨
USE(A,A1
⊕
A2)
Proof. This can be proved following the same idea as demonstrated in the proof
of Theorem 5, based on the deﬁnition of total dependency, partial dependency, and
USE, as presented in Deﬁnition 6-9. We address the sixth rule here a little bit.
The sixth rule is trivial, since Dep(A,A1
⊕
A2)
∨
USE(A,A1
⊕
A2) is al-
ways true. It is listed here because we want to emphasize that even though
USE(A,A1)
∧
USE(A,A2) is true, it is still possible Dep(A,A1
⊕
A2) is true.
That is, a component A may (totally or partially) depend on a composition of two
components, even if A only USE each component individually.
First recall that FSA1
L
A2 = FSA1 × FSA2. The key point is that in case of
the composition of two components A1 and A2, USE(A,A1) implies map(FSA1 ×
∅A2 , A1
⊕
A2, A) = ∅A, from Deﬁnition 4. Similarly, USE(A,A2) impliesmap(∅A1×
FSA2, A1
⊕
A2, A) = ∅A. However, the two conditions do not make map(FSA1 ×
FSA2, A1
⊕
A2, A) = ∅A true, which is the condition to make USE(A,A1
⊕
A2)
true. Now the paradox is clearly explained. Although component A only uses
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each individual component Ai, the relation of component A on the component
composed by these sub-components is depend instead of USE.
A more intuitive explanation is that when we have Use(A,A1), we really mean
if all the other services (from A2,...,AN ) are delivered correctly to component
A, then the failure semantics of component A1 is mapped to the normal failure
semantics of component A. But when A2 can neither correctly deliver its service to
A, the failure semantics of component A1 is not necessarily mapped to the normal
failure semantics of component A.
From the Three Dependency Relation Propagation Rules, we can then
derive the dependency relation between any two components in the system tran-
sitively (rule 1 and 2) and hierarchically (rule 3). Thus we are able to track
the system-wide USE, total and partial dependency relations between components
from local annotations. The three dependency relation propagation rules can help
to quickly determine if the dependency relation is consistent with the criticality
ordering between components, i.e., whether critical component only USE instead
of depends on less critical components. This is a very important principle in de-
signing robust real-time systems. A violation of this principle is called Dependency
Inversion, and such a software system design is said to have ill-formed dependen-
cies, as stated in Deﬁnition 10 and 11.
Finally, it is worthwhile to point out that Theorem 1-6 enable the scalabil-
ity of our DMF prototype toolkit to be presented in the next two chapters from
the theoretical perspective. Only the failure semantics mappings between imme-
diately interacting components need to be speciﬁed. What’s more, only failure
semantics mappings regarding the conjunctive composition of basic failure types
are required. Global system-wide failure propagation properties and dependency
relations can be composed from the local annotations of failure semantics mapping
based on Theorem 1-6. A more detailed discussion on scalability of our framework
is presented in Section 5.2.
26
Chapter 3
The Prototype Toolkit of DMF:
Basic Features
3.1 The architecture of DMF toolkit
In the following sections and Figure 3.1, we use the term OS-layer to denote real-
time operating system domain rules, and App-layer to denote application-speciﬁc
dependency rules. Figure 3.1 illustrates the DMF architecture. The usage of DMF
consists of two steps: Dependency Speciﬁcation and Dependency Query. First, the
users annotate the criticality and failure semantics of the components as well as the
fault/failure propagation rules across component boundaries using DMF’s Depen-
dency Speciﬁcation Language. The application-speciﬁc failure propagation rules
are of the form A.fTypeA → B.fTypeB if condition, where A and B represent
system components, fTypeA and fTypeB represent failure types for these compo-
nents, and condition is an optional expression governing under what circumstances
the failure can occur.
When loaded into DMF, these App-layer dependency speciﬁcations will be
parsed and transformed to an internal representation within DMF. The users can
then perform dependency tracking by submitting query commands to DMF. The
dependency query command is passed to the DMF reasoning engine, which rea-
sons on both the DMF-provided OS-layer dependency rules and the user-provided
App-layer dependency rules, based on the primitive dependency deﬁnitions (e.g.,
deﬁnitions for subset relations between failure semantics and deﬁnitions for total
dependency, partial dependency, and USE) and composition theorems in Chapter
2. The dependency query result is then displayed to the user in text format 1.
We will highlight the main features of DMF’s dependency speciﬁcation lan-
guage in Section 3.3 and Section 4.2, the OS-layer dependency rules in Section 4.4,
and demonstrate the usage of DMF’s dependency query commands in Section 3.4
and Section 4.3.
We choose Maude [2, 14] as the backbone logic reasoning system. The reason
1It is the real-time systems laboratory’s planned work to generate graphical format
query result. A new Ph.D. student will work toward this direction in addition to many
other future research directions as pointed out in Section 7.2.
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OS−Layer Dependency Specification:
Real−Time Domain−Specific Failure Propagation Rules
APP−Layer Dependency Specification:
Application−Specific Failure Propagation Rules
Dependency Composition Rules
Basic Definitions
Dependency Query Commands
Dependency Query Results
DMF System Modules and Interactions
DMF Reasoning Engine
DMF User Inputs
DMF Outputs
Figure 3.1: The Architecture of DMF Prototype Toolkit
why Maude is chosen is one can very naturally and easily deﬁne new logics in
Maude, together with their operational semantics. The rewriting engine of Maude
is very eﬃcient. The current version of Maude can do up to 3 million rewritings
per second on standard PCs, and its compiled version is intended to support 15
million rewritings per second [44]. Hence, we have decided to use Maude as the
backbone logic speciﬁcation and reasoning engine for DMF. However, the front-end
users need no knowledge of Maude at all.
Logically, the dependency speciﬁcation in our toolkit contains three depen-
dency speciﬁcation layers:
1. Layer I is the underlying reasoning rules for failure semantics mapping and
depend/USE relation propagation (i.e., Theorem 1-6), domain-speciﬁc failure
semantics mapping rules as presented in Section 4.4, and primitive deﬁni-
tions (e.g., deﬁnition for subset relation between failure semantics, deﬁnition
for total depend, partial depend, and USE).
2. Layer II is the application-speciﬁc failure semantics mapping rules (the in-
ternal representation is in the form map(FSSB, B,A) = FS
S
′
A if condition
.), where FSSB, FS
S
′
A , and condition are functions of annotated component
properties and their interaction protocols.
3. Layer III consists of the actual values of the annotated properties of com-
ponents and their interaction protocols in the current system design. Some
are explicit, such as communication protocol and period. While others are
implicit, such as Kalman ﬁlter delay tolerance.
The dependency query in our toolkit assists the developers to: 1) improve the
robustness of the system design; 2) compare the robustness of diﬀerent designs.
28
The dependency query commands can be categorized into two general classes:
1) high level dependency tracking, i.e., dependency inversion checking; 2) low-level
dependency tracking, i.e., impact analysis and root cause analysis. Alternatively,
they can also be viewed as four big classes of dependency query facilities, from the
perspectives of: 1) low level fault propagation, 2) high level depend/USE tracking,
3) well-formed dependency checking, and 4) robustness metric comparison.
For illustrative purpose, we perform the dependency query in view of the two
general categories for the ION CubeSat case study in this chapter, and in view
of the four dependency query facilities for the car control testbed case study in
next chapter. But it should be noticed that these two diﬀerent perspectives are
just diﬀerent views of the DMF dependency tracking facilities, nothing more. And
we illustrate these facilities in diﬀerent ways so that readers can get a deeper and
more versatile understanding of the tool itself.
3.2 A brief description of the ION CubeSat
Historically, space has been the purview of government agencies with multi-billion
dollar budgets. Typical satellites took hundreds of millions of dollars and many
years to develop. However, the fast pace of progress in the areas of integrated cir-
cuits, microprocessors, and electronics in general in recent years, coupled with un-
precedented access to computing, information, and other technological resources,
has brought the development of amateur satellites within the reach of ordinary
people. The biggest obstacle to satellite development is no longer the technical
challenge involved, but rather the prohibitive costs and bureaucracy involved in
organizing a launch.
It was this problem that the CubeSat standard, developed jointly by the Cali-
fornia Polytechnic State University and Stanford University, sought to solve. The
CubeSat standard sets out guidelines and speciﬁcations for interfacing an ama-
teur satellite with a standard launcher, provided by CalPoly. This allows satellite
developers to focus on building the satellite, leaving all of the logistics and un-
related technical challenges of launching the satellite to someone else. Of all of
the CubeSat speciﬁcations, the most notable is that which governs the dimensions
and mass of the satellite. All CubeSats measure 10cm x 10cm x 10cm and can
weigh no more than 1kg, with the option of building double or triple CubeSats
(measuring 20cm and 30cm in height and weighing 2kg and 3kg, respectively).
The CubeSat community has over forty universities registered with plans to
develop CubeSats with scientiﬁc, private, or government payloads. To date, there
have been two launches under the auspices of the CubeSat program with two
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more scheduled to take place in the near future. The University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign has recently completed development of ION (Illinois Observ-
ing Nanosatellite), a double CubeSat, which has been launched on July 26, 2006.
ION was built entirely by students, who were fully responsible for all project lead-
ership, design, development, and testing. Over the course of the past four years,
over 80 students across 7 engineering disciplines including Electrical, Computer,
Aerospace, Computer Science, Mechanical, Theoretical and Applied Mechanics,
and General Engineering have been involved in the development of ION.
ION’s missions include:
1. Measuring molecular oxygen airglow emissions in the Earth’s mesosphere
using a photomultiplier tube.
2. Performing space testing of Alameda Applied Sciences Corp. micro-vacuum
arc thrusters.
3. Performing space testing of Tether Application’s Small Integrated Datalog-
ger processor board.
4. Performing earth imaging using a CMOS camera.
5. Demonstrating active attitude stabilization on a CubeSat.
To fulﬁll these mission objectives, ION has an above-average set of system
components. Aside from the standard batteries, solar panels, processor, memory,
antenna, radio, modem, temperature sensors, and voltage and current sensors, ION
also has a CMOS camera, photomultiplier tube (PMT), thrusters, torque coils, and
a 3 axis magnetic ﬁeld sensor. Due to the complexity of ION’s mission objectives,
a simple software system was not suﬃcient to fully control all of the components
onboard. As a result, a complete operating system was written almost entirely
from scratch, including a system scheduler, ﬁlesystem, applications, drivers, and
libraries to run ION. A custom communication protocol was also developed for
ION that allows for arbitrary scheduling of tasks, conﬁguration of the devices
onboard, and downloading of newly created data.
A diagram of the software system, with most of the components and their
relationships, is shown in Figure 3.2.
It is out of the scope of this thesis to fully elaborate on ION’s architecture
and design issues. Interested readers can ﬁnd full information in [3] and [18]. The
homepage of ION CubeSat also has a lot of useful information of this project 2.
2ION CubeSat Project: http://cubesat.ece.uiuc.edu/
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Figure 3.2: The ION CubeSAT Software System
3.3 Dependency speciﬁcation language of
DMF
The following section details the syntax and features of the dependency speciﬁca-
tion language, utilizing examples taken from the fault propagation rules for the
ION CubeSat. ION CubeSat was developed entirely at the University of Illinois,
with around 50,000 lines of code. It controls every aspect of the satellite. The
system consists of quite a lot of applications and drivers, each responsible for a
speciﬁc hardware component of the satellite.
The case study presented in this chapter is a cooperation achievement of this
author and a master student, Leon Arber, who is one of the primary software de-
velopers of ION CubeSat. Arber is responsible for writing down the dependency
speciﬁcations following DMF’s dependency speciﬁcation language syntax. This au-
thor is responsible for assisting him to design and perform the dependency queries
to detect dependency inversions and track dependency propagations in the satel-
lite system. It is also an iterative process to further improve the DMF toolkit’s
speciﬁcation and query features to make it more usable and scalable by doing such
a serious case study on a real world, complex software system.
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3.3.1 Components, criticalities, and failure sets.
Before one can begin writing fault propagation rules, DMF must have some notion
of the components that will be involved, their criticalities, and the failure sets of
these components.
In the case of ION, 35 components were identiﬁed, along with over 160 unique
failure types. As an example, consider the ﬁlesystem onboard ION. This compo-
nent’s criticality and failure set is written as:
swFS(3): fCreateFile, fReadFile, fWriteFile, fInit, fOpenFile, fCorruption,
sFSFull;
This line deﬁnes a component called swFS, which will represent the ﬁlesystem
onboard ION. We use the sw shorthand throughout to represent a software com-
ponent. The criticality of swFS is 3, with small numbers representing relatively
non-critical components and large number representing more critical components.
Note that criticality is not absolute and is deﬁned relative to the other components
in the system. Furthermore, since the criticality is speciﬁed as an integer, there is
an eﬀectively inﬁnite number of diﬀerent criticalities available, allowing for very
ﬁne-grained criticality speciﬁcation.
Following the component deﬁnition and its criticality is the failure set of this
component. The failures listed are standard for any ﬁlesystem, with the f preﬁx
being notational shorthand for failure and the s preﬁx notational shorthand for a
state that is not a failure in and of itself but which may lead to other failures. For
example, the sFSFull state (a state representing a full ﬁlesystem) is not considered
a failure by itself. However, the sFSFull state will lead to the fWriteFile (a failure
that occurs when a ﬁle is written in the ﬁlesystem) and fCreateFile (a failure that
occurs when a ﬁle is created in the ﬁlesystem) failures.
Notice that the sw preﬁx for components and the f and s preﬁx for failures are
just the annotation styles that Leon Arber prefers. It’s not a requirement of DMF.
The DMF users are free to choose whatever annotation styles they like provided
that they follow the dependency speciﬁcation language syntax.
3.3.2 Component inheritance
Aside from the basic component criticality and failure set speciﬁcations shown
above, DMF also supports the concept of inheritance, in a style similar to that of
superclass and subclass of Object-Oriented Programming. This feature is useful
since systems often have many components that share a common set of failures.
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An example of component inheritance is 3
swPowerApp(5) extends swApplication: fDeadlineMiss, fPowerSampleWrite,
fPowerSampleData, fPowerSampleUpdateBeacon, fAutoPowerExec, fAutoPower-
SetState, fSetPowerStateExec, fSetPowerStateInvalid;
This statement deﬁnes a new component called swPowerApp, which derives
from swApplication. The meaning of each failure term of swPowerApp can be found
in Table 3.1. The supercomponent itself, in this case swApplication, is deﬁned just
like any other component (the only exception being that the criticality of abstract
components must be 0):
swApplication(0): fRehash, fInvalidConﬁgData, fGiveUpCPU, fStart, fOpe-
nOutputDataﬁle, fGetWorkUnit, fInitialRehash;
The meaning of each failure term of swPowerApp can be found in Table 3.2.
As a result of component inheritance, the failure set of swApplication will
be appended to the failure set of swPowerApp. In general, component inheri-
tance works by setting the failure set of component A as failureSet(A)
⋃
failure-
Set(superComponent(A)). What’s more, during the dependency tracking process,
if the fault propagation rule A.FA → B.? is not explicitly speciﬁed, then the fault
propagation rules superComponent(A).FA → B.?, A.FA → superComponent(B).?,
and superComponent(A).FA → superComponent(B).? are examined one by one.
This OOP class inheritance style allows for expressive and ﬂexible speciﬁca-
tions. For example, in ION’s dependency speciﬁcation, all of the high-level com-
ponents (e.g., swPowerApp, swCameraApp, swHousekeepingApp, swTorqueApp,
swTempApp, swCommApp) are subcomponents of the abstract component swAp-
plication. This is identical to the way the classes are deﬁned in the source code
(e.g., class PowerApp : public Application, and Application is an abstract class).
Since all of the application classes derive from a single abstract class, it is natural
for some failures to be identical across all applications, and component inheritance
provides a natural way of representing this relationship.
3.3.3 Boolean expressions of failure propagation rules
After all of the components, criticalities, and failure sets have been annotated, the
next step is to deﬁne the fault propagation rules. Fault propagation rules specify
3Notice that the examples listed in this chapter are only for illustrative purposes - to
illustrate the dependency speciﬁcation language syntax and query facilities. We only create
a table to explain the meaning of each term in the following two speciﬁcation examples. A
full explanation of the meaning of each failure term and failure propagation rule and a full
description of the case study are out of the scope of this dissertation, and the interested
readers are referred to Leon Arber’s master thesis [11].
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Failure Term Meaning of This Failure Term
fDeadlineMiss The power application misses its deadline.
fPowerSampleWrite
The power application fails to write out the
latest voltage/current readings to the ﬁle system.
fPowerSampleData
The power application fails to sample the latest
voltage/current readings.
fPowerSampleUpdateBeacon
The power application fails to update the beacon
with the latest voltage/current readings.
fAutoPowerExec
The work unit dealing with autonomous (i.e.,
not-ground controlled) power management fails
to execute.
fAutoPowerSetState
The power application fails to properly set
the current power state as directed by the
autonomous power work unit.
fSetPowerStateExec
The power application fails to execute the work
unit responsible for setting the power state (as
controlled from the ground).
fSetPowerStateInvalid
The power application sets the power state of
the system incorrectly.
Table 3.1: The Failure Terms of Component swPowerApp
Failure Term Meaning of This Failure Term
fRehash
An application fails to update its settings as com-
manded by the ground.
fInvalidConﬁgData
An application ﬁnds that its conﬁguration ﬁle was
corrupt.
fGiveUpCPU
An application fails to give up the CPU to another
application.
fStart An application fails to start up.
fOpenOutputDataﬁle An application fails to open an output data ﬁle.
fGetWorkUnit An application cannot get the next work unit for itself.
fInitialRehash
An application fails to perform its initial read of
default settings upon satellite startup.
Table 3.2: The Failure Terms of Component swApplication
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precisely what the causes and eﬀects of any given failure are. The most basic fault
propagation rules take the following form:
swFS.fOpenFile → swApplication.fRehash;
The fault propagation rule states that, if the swFS component experiences
the fOpenFile failure, then the swApplication component will experience the fRe-
hash failure. Note that this fault propagation rule only lists interactions between
neighboring components. The cause of the fOpenFile failure and the eﬀect of the
fRehash failure would be listed in separate fault propagation rules. Furthermore,
since swApplication is supercomponent of many other components, this rule would
result in every subcomponent of swApplication also experiencing the fRehash fail-
ure.
Since most failures result in a complex series of fault propagations, boolean
operators are often required to fully describe a fault propagation rule. Boolean
operators can be used on both the source (left-hand) and target (right-hand) side
of a fault propagation rule. This is an example of a boolean operator being used
to specify the eﬀect of a failure:
swTNCDriver.fPowerUp → swCommApp.fPowerUp ∧ swTNCDriver.fReadWrite;
This rules states that the fPowerUp failure of the swTNCDriver component
results in the fPowerUp failure of the swCommApp component and the fReadWrite
failures of the swTNCDriver component.
Boolean operator can also be used on the source side of a fault propagation
rule, as shown in this example:
(swApplication.fGiveUpCPU ∧ swAppManagerStartup.fCPU WDTInit) ∨
swSysInit.fConﬁgFileInvalid → swSatellite.fSatelliteReset;
This example shows that, if any subcomponent of the swApplication component
suﬀers a fGiveUpCPU failure and the swAppManagerStartup component suﬀers
the fCPU WDTInit failure or the swSysInit component suﬀers the fConﬁgFileIn-
valid failure, then the swSatellite component will fail with fSatelliteReset.
3.3.4 Parameterized failure semantics and
dependency expressions
All of the fault propagation rules so far have listed qualitative relationships between
the diﬀerent failures. However, there are circumstances in which failures have
quantitative values associated with them. In the case of ION, for example, the
watchdog timers will reset the satellite in 11 minutes if they are not kicked. This
sort of quantitative failure can be represented like this:
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swHousekeepingApp.fKickWDTExec → swSatellite.fSatelliteReset〈11〉;
This fault propagation rule states that, if the swHousekeepingApp component
has the fKickWDTExec failure, then the satellite will reset in 11 minutes.
Another thing to be mentioned here is that this failure propagation rule can be
combined with the (swApplication.fGiveUpCPU ∧ swAppManStartup.fCPU WDTInit)
∨ ... → swSatellite.fSatelliteReset; rule above. Actually, they can either be com-
bined through a ∨ in one single rule or separated into two rules. DMF treat them
identically.
Here, we call fSatelliteReset〈11〉 a parameterized failure type. Generally, pa-
rameterized failure types and dependency expressions enable users of DMF to en-
code application-speciﬁc information into the failures and their propagation rules.
For example, the user should not only be able to specify that a component has
a fDeadlineMiss failure but should also be able to specify an upper limit on the
number of consecutive deadline misses the service receiver component can tolerate.
This can be denoted as, for example, fDeadlineMiss〈5〉. Actually, we have already
addressed the need for parameterized failure semantics in Section 2.1.
What’s more, the user should also be able to specify that only when the system
is designed in a certain manner (e.g., the connection between two components is
TCP instead of UDP), can such a failure propagation rule be validate. That is,
the failure propagation rules can be guarded by OS or application design proper-
ties. We will illustrate this feature together with the real-time domain support in
Chapter 4.
3.4 Dependency tracking facilities of DMF
In this section, we demonstrate the dependency tracking facilities of DMF as ap-
plied to the ION CubeSat. First of all, it is worth noting that just the eﬀort of
annotating the criticality, failure set, and failure propagation rules of a system
helps developers to become more aware of the system’s failure propagation behav-
iors and alerts them to failures or propagations that may have been overlooked.
Then, with the aid of dependency tracking facilities, DMF will further assist the
developers in checking whether the system design has well-formed dependencies.
DMF will also help the users to discover the best places to enforce fault tolerance
and masking mechanisms to improve the robustness of the system.
In addition, DMF allows developers to examine their system as a whole and
determine which components are interacting and which components can result in
critical failures. This knowledge can then be used to focus debugging and testing
eﬀorts on components in the critical path.
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Dependency tracking can be done at diﬀerent levels. High-level dependency
tracking checks whether the system design has well-formed dependencies. Low-
level dependency tracking quantiﬁes the nature of the dependency relation from a
fault propagation perspective, i.e., to what extent does the correctness of A depend
on the correctness of B; or, put another way, what is the set of faults of B that
will cause A to become faulty.
3.4.1 High-level dependency tracking – dependency
inversion checking
Please refer the deﬁnitions of dependency strength and dependency inversion to
Section 2.2. DMF tracks the high level total depend/partial depend/USE relations
with the following query commands:
• Query: depUseRelation (Component1, Component2)
Returns: total dependency, partial dependency, or USE relation of Com-
ponent1 on Component2
• Query: depInversion
Returns: all pairs of components in the system where a dependency inver-
sion occurs.
For example, in ION, a dependency inversion check returns the following re-
sults (some have been omitted for the sake of brevity). TDEP stands for total
dependency and PDEP stands for partial dependency. The integer in the brackets
is the criticality of the corresponding component.
{PDEP : swResetMode[9] , swBootloaderHighLevel[8]};
{PDEP : swResetMode[9], swSysInit[7]};
{PDEP : swResetMode[9] , swFS[3]};
{PDEP : swPowerApp[5] , swFS[3]};
{TDEP : swPowerApp[5] , swTime[2]};
{TDEP : swPowerApp[5] , swRTCDriver[2]};
{TDEP : swPowerApp[5] , swAnalogConverter[4]};
{PDEP : swCameraApp[4] , swFS[3]};
{TDEP : swCameraApp[4] , swTime[2]};
{TDEP : swCameraApp[4] , swRTCDriver[2]};
There are a total of over 40 dependency inversion pairs. Among them, one
quarter are between high level application modules and low level device drivers,
such as {TDEP: swPowerApp[5] , swRTCDriver[2]}. In reality, though, this should
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be regarded not as a serious dependency inversion but as a criticality speciﬁcation
mistake. The criticality of a device driver should be speciﬁed as the maximum
of the criticalities of the application modules that receive service from the device
driver. When there is a criticality speciﬁcation mistake, the DMF users should
not only correct the criticality annotation mistake but also test and verify the
well-formed dependencies once again according to the raised criticality level.
However, more than half of the dependency inversion pairs in ION are between
normal application modules and seemingly unrelated system components, such as
the dependency inversion between swPowerApp and swFS. Intuitively, any failure
of the ﬁle system should not aﬀect the normal operation of the power management
application. So, the cause of this dependency inversion should clearly be investi-
gated, and, if possible, eliminated. In Section 3.4.2, we discuss the impact and
rootCause dependency queries, which are speciﬁcally designed to track down the
cause of dependency inversions.
3.4.2 Low-level dependency tracking – impact
analysis and root cause analysis
DMF supports two basic low-level dependency tracking and reasoning queries.
• Query: impact (Component, Failure) and impactPP (Component,
Failure)
Returns: The list of {Component, Failure} pairs that a failure Failure of
component Component will cause through direct or indirect service delivery.
impactPP will also show the forward failure propagation path that results
in the failures of the resulting components.
• Query: rootCause (Component, Failure) and rootCausePP (Com-
ponent, Failure)
Returns: The list of {Component, Failure} pairs that can result in fail-
ure Failure of component Component. rootCausePP will also show the
backward failure propagation path that results in the failure of the queried
component.
For example, impactPP(swPowerDriver, fSetState) returns the following
(some results have been omitted for the sake of brevity):
{swPowerApp , fAutoPowerSetState}
PATH: {swPowerDriver , fSetState} → {swPowerApp , fAutoPowerSetState}
{swCameraApp , fRequestHighPower}
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PATH: {swPowerDriver , fSetState} → {swPowerApp , fAutoPowerSetState}
→ {swCameraApp , fRequestHighPower}
{swCameraDriver , fCameraOnWithoutHighPower}
PATH: {swPowerDriver , fSetState} → {swPowerApp , fAutoPowerSetState}
→ {swCameraDriver , fCameraOnWithoutHighPower}
... ...
{swSatellite , fSampleData}
PATH: {swPowerDriver , fSetState} → {swPowerApp , fAutoPowerSetState}
→ {swCameraApp , fRequestHighPower} → {swSatellite , fSampleData}
{swSatellite , fSatelliteReset}
PATH: {swPowerDriver , fSetState} → {swPowerApp , fAutoPowerSetState}
→ {swCameraDriver , fCameraOnWithoutHighPower}
→ {swSatellite , fSatelliteReset}
There are several other queries based upon the impactPP(Component1,
Failure1) query. On of these is the impactAllFailures(Component1, Com-
ponent2) query, which returns all failures of Component2 that can result from any
failure of Component1. Recall from earlier that there was a dependency inversion
between swPowerApp and swFS. An impactAllFailures(swFS, swPowerApp)
query can be used to show how this occurred (the intermediate {Component, Fail-
ure} pairs along the fault propagation paths have been omitted for the sake of
brevity):
{swPowerApp , fPowerSampleWrite}
PATH: {swFS , fWriteFile} → ... ... → {swPowerApp , fPowerSampleWrite}
{swPowerApp , fPowerSampleWrite}
PATH: {swFS , sFSFull} → ... ... → {swPowerApp , fPowerSampleWrite}
Here, we can see the source of the dependency inversion between swPowerApp
and swFS. However, since the aﬀected failure of swPowerApp is an event logging
failure (fPowerSampleWrite is shorthand for unable to write updated power data to
a data ﬁle), this failure will most likely not result in any other catastrophic failure.
This intuition can be conﬁrmed by the dependency query impact(swPowerApp,
fPowerSampleWrite), which reveals that the system level failure aﬀected is
{swSatellite, fSampleData}, which does not interfere with the normal operation
of the satellite. Therefore, we can regard this dependency inversion warning as a
false positive.
We now turn our attention to inspecting a dependency inversion that turns out
to be far more serious. The query impactAllFailures(swAnalogConverter,
swPowerApp) returns the following:
{swPowerApp , fAutoPowerExec}
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PATH: {swAnalogConverter , fSampleData} → ... ... →
{swPowerApp , fPowerSampleData} → {swPowerApp , fAutoPowerExec}
Notice that fAutoPowerExec is a serious failure, which results in the system
potentially operating in an incorrect power state, and one in which high power
requests from certain critical devices may be denied. The eﬀect can be revealed
by the query impact(swPowerApp, fAutoPowerExec), which returns, among
other things, {swSatellite , fSatelliteDead}. Therefore, we can conclude that this
is a very serious dependency inversion which must be removed. From the failure
propagation path, we see that the optimal place to cut oﬀ the failure propaga-
tion is to prevent the fSampleData failure of the swAnalogConverter from being
propagated to the fPowerSampleData failure of swPowerApp. One way to reduce
the likelihood of this happening is to add redundancy to the analog converter by
duplicating hardware.
In a similar fashion, the users of DMF can issue the rootCausePP(swSatellite,
fSatelliteDead) query to reveal the reverse failure propagation paths which lead
to a failure of the satellite.
In addition, the case study of ION CubeSAT does demonstrate that design
ﬂaws in system design become evident when writing dependency speciﬁcation, for
example, large number of ﬂaws per component, large number of propagation rules
per component, tendency to label all components as critical, and large number
of dependency inversions due to criticality misspeciﬁcation. DMF also helps the
developer to locate some root causes of satellite failure which otherwise will be
overlooked, such as the failures in the ﬁle systems and bootloader. A detailed
description of this case study can be found in Leon Arber’s master thesis [11].
To summarize, by combining the various query commands, the users of DMF
can get a clear understanding of the failure propagation behavior of the target
system, be alerted to potential dependency inversions, and be revealed more de-
tailed information through impact and root cause analysis. They can then use
these results to improve the robustness of the system design by enforcing fault tol-
erance mechanisms. The results of the ION case study are already being applied
to aid the design of the second generation ION satellite, which is currently under
development.
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Chapter 4
The Prototype Toolkit of DMF:
Advanced Features
In this chapter, we present the advanced features of DMF toolkit, i.e., parameter-
ized failure semantics and dependency expressions, and real-time systems domain
support. We also explain the dependency tracking facilities from an alternative
view by exploiting the case study on the distributed car control testbed. The im-
plementation issues of each dependency tracking facility are also brieﬂy discussed
in this chapter.
We ﬁrst list the components of the distributed car control testbed in Sec-
tion 4.1. We then demonstrate how our toolkit tackles challenge II (desired tight
binding due to constantly changing software designs, referring to Section 1.3) in
Section 4.2. We will demonstrate how to make use of the information of depen-
dency tracking in improving robustness of the system design and how to compare
the robustness of diﬀerent designs in Section 4.3, and implementation issues are
brieﬂy discussed with respect to each dependency tracking feature.
4.1 A brief description of the distributed
car control testbed
In the examples presented in this chapter, we investigate the dependency relations
in the execution/scheduling unit layer, i.e., between threads. That is, in the fol-
lowing discussion, a component of the distributed car control testbed denotes a
thread. Suppose there are N cars to be controlled in the system, and they are
numbered as car 1, car i, ..., car N .
Vision server only has 1 thread, denoted as VS.
In addition to the main thread, the threads of location server include:
• LSvs: receive location packet from VS
• LStm: send location packet to trajectory manager
• LScc[i]: send location packet to the i-th car controller
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In addition to the main thread, the threads of trajectory manager include:
• TMls: receive location packet from LStm
• TMcc[i]: send desired trajectory information to the i-th car controller
In addition to the main thread, the threads of the i-th car controller include:
• CCls[i]: receive location packet from LScc[i], and perform model-based state
estimation in case of packet loss if Kalman ﬁlter is installed
• CCtm[i]: receive desired trajectory information from TMcc[i]
• CCstop[i]: detect the scenario when another car is too close to itself, and
may directly send out stop command to the actuator in emergency (this is
called fail-safe stop)
• CCcal[i]: calculate control command based on the desired trajectory, and
send control command to the actuator. It may also plan a temporary tra-
jectory deviation to avoid collision.
It should be pointed out that CCstop[i] is conservatively designed to tolerate
the uncertainty in cars’ locations, e.g., 5 distance units. As long as the distance
between cars are larger than the uncertainty in cars’ locations, there will be no
collision, because CCstop[i] will stop the car i once the distance between cars are
close to 5 distance units. In other words, LocationError〈0,5〉 fault can be tolerated
by the system. Therefore, in the original design of the car control testbed as
illustrated in Figure 1.2(a), LocationError〈5,Inf〉 cannot be tolerated and may
lead to car collision.
But in the enhanced design as illustrated in Figure 1.2(b), a Kalman ﬁlter is
installed at the site of each car controller, and a too large location value error (i.e.,
larger than 10 distance units) can be detected by CCls[i] based on state estimation.
The CCstop[i] will thus perform a fail-safe stop either when another car is within
5 distance units from the i-th car or when a location value error is detected. That
is, in the enhanced design, only LocationError〈5,10〉 cannot be tolerated and may
lead to car collision.
There are other components who take care of the friendly user interface and
other functionalities. To make the following presentation clear, we do not go into
further details.
We deﬁne three system-level failures. The catastrophic system failure is Col-
lision, i.e., car collision occurs. The less severe system failure is FailSafeStop, i.e.,
cars are stopped to avoid possible collision in case of serious communication block
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or emergency. The third is TrajectoryError, that is, there is no collision or fail-safe
stop, but the trajectory following errors are unacceptable.
An important objective of dependency management is to make sure that no
dependency inversion exists. That is, faults/failures of the less critical components
(components to realize the less critical requirements) will not be propagated to the
more critical components (components to realize the more critical requirements).
That is, critical components only USE instead of depends on less critical compo-
nents. A violation of this principle indicates that the system design has ill-formed
dependencies.
From the criticality of the system failures, we can see that the most critical
requirement of the car control system is collision free. That is, it should be guar-
anteed that the cars will not collide with each other. Based on this, the secondary
critical requirement is that the cars should follow their desired trajectory as much
as possible, i.e., the error between the actual trajectory and the desired trajectory
for each car, including the error between the actual time and desired time to reach
a certain position, should be as small as possible. The car control system also has
optional requirements, such as an easy-to-use user interface.
In the distributed car control testbed, the most critical components, which
are essential to avoid car collision, are VS, LSvs, LScc, CCls, and CCstop. The
other less critical components, which work together with most critical components
to realize the trajectory following objective, are LStm, TMls, TMcc, CCtm and
CCcal. The components responsible for friendly user interface, which are not
listed here, are useful but non-critical components.
4.2 Tight binding between dependency
expressions and software system designs
In this section, we present a few examples of the dependency speciﬁcation lan-
guage, emphasizing the tight binding between dependency expressions and soft-
ware designs. The tight binding is realized by keeping track of the failure semantics
mapping rules automatically as a function of annotated properties of components
and their interaction protocols.
Example 1: With respect to the use of TCP or UDP connection between VS
and LSvs, we have the following failure propagation rules.
VS.Crash → LSvs.Lockup
if commProtocol (VS, LSvs) == TCP;
VS.Crash → LSvs.Suspend〈recoveryTime(VS)〉
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if commProtocol (VS, LSvs) == UDP;
That is, if TCP is used directly and if VS crashes, LSvs locks up and cannot
continue even if VS is restarted. When UDP is used, LSvs will resume its service
from suspension, when VS is restarted. The suspension duration is equal to the
time needed by VS to recover from the crash.
Example 2: With Kalman ﬁlter installed at car controllers, the fail-safe stop
parameter k is a function of the location packet update period p and the Kalman
ﬁlter delay tolerance T . The following annotation concerns with the mapping of
the DeadlineMiss failure of the location server to the car controllers.
LScc[i].DeadlineMiss〈n〉 → CCls[i].Normal
if n <= ﬂoor (CCls[i].T / period (LScc[i], CCls[i]));
LScc[i].DeadlineMiss〈n〉 → CCls[i].FailToPredict
if n > ﬂoor (CCls[i].T / period (LScc[i], CCls[i]));
That is, with Kalman ﬁlter installed at car controllers, up to k consecutive
location packets from the location server can miss their deadlines, where k = Tp .
But if the consecutive deadline misses of location packets exceed k, CCls[i] exhibits
a FailToPredict failure, and CCstop[i] will be notiﬁed and immediately issue a stop
command to the actuator, i.e., the i-th car has to perform fail-safe stop. Kalman
ﬁlter delay tolerance T is a design property of the component CCls[i], while packet
update period p is a design property of the interaction between component LScc[i]
and CCls[i]. A too big location value error in the location packet can also be
detected based on the model-based state estimation. The above annotation only
concerns the DeadlineMiss failure.
In the TCP/UDP example 1, the dependency expression (failure semantics
mapping speciﬁcation) is a function of the interaction protocol between compo-
nents. In the Kalman ﬁlter example 2, the dependency expression is a function of
the annotated property of the components and their interaction properties. Gen-
erally, we deﬁne dependency based on the failure semantics mapping notion, and
keep track of the failure dependency relations automatically as a function of the
annotated properties of components, interaction protocols, and the environment.
Our prototype toolkit automatically updates the aﬀected failure propagation rules
given the system design changes.
For example, the original design of the communication protocol between VS
and LSvs is TCP, thus the underlying reasoning engine automatically applies the
following rules in dependency tracking:
VS.Crash → LSvs.Lockup;
Later, the communication protocol between VS and LSvs is changed from TCP
to UDP as illustrated in Figure 1(b). Suppose recoveryTime(VS) = 4, i.e., the time
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for the vision server to recovery from a crash is 4 seconds by design. The underlying
reasoning engine will then automatically change the mapping rule to:
VS.Crash → LSvs.Suspend〈4〉;
Note that when LSvs locks up, the system will lock up and all the cars will
be stuck in the failure-safe stop state even if VS is restarted. When the UDP is
used between VS and LSvs, the car may continue to run smoothly as long as VS
is successfully restarted before missing k packets.
Example 3: Suppose that the performance of Kalman ﬁlter is improved by
new design and the delay tolerance T becomes 11 seconds from the original 7
seconds. Suppose also that the desired location packet update period is 2.5 seconds,
then the above failure semantics mapping rules are automatically updated. That
is,
LScc[i].DeadlineMiss〈n〉 → CCls[i].Normal if n <= 2;
LScc[i].DeadlineMiss〈n〉 → CCls[i].FailToPredict if n > 2;
Become
LScc[i].DeadlineMiss〈n〉 → CCls[i].Normal if n <= 4;
LScc[i].DeadlineMiss〈n〉 → CCls[i].FailToPredict if n > 4;
Recall that the dependency speciﬁcation in our toolkit contains three depen-
dency speciﬁcation layers, as presented in Section 3.1. When the software design
changes, the underlying dependency reasoning engine tracks the system design an-
notation changes in layer III, and automatically update the aﬀected failure propa-
gation rules in layer II. That is, the developer is not burdened to change the failure
semantics mapping speciﬁcation in layer II whenever the actual component prop-
erty or interaction protocol is changed. The only necessary update is the current
values of the annotated design properties in layer III.
One important point should be mentioned here. Including the component
properties and interaction protocols, the speciﬁcation of failure semantics mapping
rules are local to the components, since they only concern the failure propagation
between immediately interacting components. In other words, all the annotations
above are local views. But a global view of the failure propagation along the
dependency chain can be obtained via the composition of these local views by
transitively or hierarchically applying Theorem 1-6. Thus the scalability of our
approach is guaranteed.
45
4.3 Improving the robustness and
comparing the robustness of diﬀerent
designs
We now turn our focus on how our reasoning framework and toolkit will assist us
to 1) improve the robustness of the system design; 2) compare the robustness of
diﬀerent designs. Our prototype toolkit supports four dependency management
functionalities to achieve this objective, from the perspectives of low level fault
propagation, high level depend/USE tracking, well-formed dependency checking,
and robustness metric comparison separately 1.
In robust real-time systems, we want key properties not aﬀected by the poten-
tial faults in the services delivered by other components. In the distributed car
control testbed, ﬁrst of all, we want to ensure the correct functioning of the fail-
safe stop operation. Second, we want to keep the cars running as much as possible.
This requires us to have the fail-safe stop parameter k updated whenever location
packet update period p or Kalman ﬁlter delay tolerance T is changed. We have
already demonstrated this in the examples above. We have also illustrated that
the use of UDP avoids the lockup of LSvs when VS crashes and reboots due to
resource leaking (or preventive reboot). That is, UDP improves performance. The
following examples illustrate the comparisons of the robustness of diﬀerent designs
when a low quality (but the quality is not low enough to be discovered as bad)
image taken by the ceiling-mounted camera is received by the vision server, and
hence a value error in the location packet.
4.3.1 Low level dependency tracking
The prototype toolkit supports two basic low level dependency tracking and rea-
soning functionalities. The reasoning engine tracks and reasons about the fault/failure
propagation based on the dependency speciﬁcation and Theorem 1-3.
• Usage: impactPP (Component, Failure)
Performs: forward analysis, i.e., impact analysis
Returns: the components and corresponding failures incurred by Failure
of Component through direct or indirect service delivery, and the forward
failure propagation path ({Component , Failure} → ...)
1Again, this is an alternative view of the DMF dependency management facilities as
illustrated in Section 3.4. We illustrate these facilities in diﬀerent views so that readers
can get a deeper and more versatile understanding of the tool itself.
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• Usage: rootCausePP (Component, Failure)
Performs: backward analysis, i.e., root-cause analysis
Returns: the components and corresponding failures leading to Failure of
Component through direct or indirect service delivery, and the backward
failure propagation path (... ← {Component , Failure})
Our toolkit also supports the forward analysis when two or more failures occur
at the same time, for example:
• Usage: impactPP (Component1, Failure1, Component2, Failure2)
We now show how to compare the robustness of diﬀerent designs from the
perspective of low level dependency tracking with two utility examples. Recall
that (Section 4.1) in the original design of the distributed car control testbed, any
value error larger than 5 will lead to car collisions. While in the enhanced design,
only value error larger than 5 and smaller than 10 will lead to car collisions.
Example 4: In the original design, impactPP(VS, LocationError〈15〉)
will return the following:
• {LSvs , LocationError〈15〉}
Path: {VS , LocationError〈15〉} → {LSvs , LocationError〈15〉}
• {LScc[i] , LocationError〈15〉}
Path: {VS , LocationError〈15〉} → {LSvs , LocationError〈15〉}
→ {LScc[i] , LocationError〈15〉}
• {CCls[i] , LocationError〈15〉}
Path: {VS , LocationError〈15〉} → {LSvs , LocationError〈15〉}
→ {LScc[i] , LocationError〈15〉} → {CCls[i] , LocationError〈15〉}
• {System , Collision}
Path: {VS , LocationError〈15〉} → {LSvs , LocationError〈15〉}
→ {LScc[i] , LocationError〈15〉} → {CCls[i] , LocationError〈15〉}
→ {System , Collision}
where System is a key word of our toolkit, exclusively used to associate with
system-level failures.
The above information of failure propagation path is very useful in assisting the
developers to improve the robustness of the system design. It helps the developers
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to discover the multiple possible choices, and even the best choice, of places where
fault masking or tolerance mechanism should be enforced. For example, in the
enhanced design, the failure propagation path from {LScc[i] , LocationError〈15〉}
to {CCls[i] , LocationError〈15〉} can be blocked by installing a Kalman ﬁlter at
the site of car controller i. Any location error larger than 10 distance units can be
detected by CCls[i], and CCstop[i] will perform fail-safe stop to avoid collision.
Example 5: In the enhanced design, impactPP(VS, LocationError〈15〉)
will return the following:
• {LSvs , LocationError〈15〉}
Path: {VS , LocationError〈15〉} → {LSvs , LocationError〈15〉}
• {LScc[i] , LocationError〈15〉}
Path: {VS , LocationError〈15〉} → {LSvs , LocationError〈15〉}
→ {LScc[i] , LocationError〈15〉}
• {CCls[i] , LocationErrorDetected}
Path: {VS , LocationError〈15〉} → {LSvs , LocationError〈15〉}
→ {LScc[i] , LocationError〈15〉} → {CCls[i] , LocationErrorDetected}
• {System , FailSafeStop}
Path: {VS , LocationError〈15〉} → {LSvs , LocationError〈15〉}
→ {LScc[i] , LocationError〈15〉} → {CCls[i] , LocationErrorDetected}
→ {System , FailSafeStop}
where LocationErrorDetected is a component state concerning fault detection or
masking, not a fault, of CCls[i]. The introduction of component state of fault
detection or masking enables more ﬂexible fault propagation rules.
Comparing the two query results of Example 4 and Example 5, we can see that
the enhanced design is more robust than the original design when there is value
error in the location packet.
We now have a brief discussion of several implementation issues. For the de-
pendency query impact (Component1, Failure1, Component2, Failure2), the query
result is the union of the query result of impact (Component1, Failure1), and im-
pact (Component2, Failure2), as well as the possible failures that will occur when
these two failures happen at the same time (Notice that some fault/failure map-
ping rule may be in the form Component1.Failure1 ∧ Component2.Failure2
→ Component3.Failure3). Recall that Component1. Failure1 ∨ Component2.
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Failure2 → Component3. Failure3 will be decomposed to Component1. Failure1
→ Component3. Failure3 and Component2. Failure2 → Component3. Failure3,
therefore, in the underlying internal representation, there is no ∨ composition rules.
Actually, even for the basic dependency query impact (Component, Fail-
ure), the ∧ composition rules may still be encountered during the reasoning pro-
cess. Because Component . Failure may lead to Componenti . Failurei and
Componentj . Failurej through diﬀerent service delivery paths, and these two
failures may conjunctively lead to Componentk . Failurek. Therefore, we need
to iteratively explore the possible conjunctive combinations of all the impacted
failures to see whether new failures will be incurred due to a certain combination.
The iteration terminates and the ﬁnal query result is returned when no new fail-
ure is introduced for any conjunctive combination of the failures that have already
been discovered.
Fortunately, most failure semantics mapping rules of software systems do not
involve too many component failures on the left side, or they can be hierarchically
decomposed to failure semantics mapping rules with simpler conjunctive boolean
expression on the left side. So we needn’t worry too much about the eﬃciency of
the query reasoning engine.
4.3.2 High level dependency tracking
The prototype toolkit supports the high level depend/USE relation tracking and
reasoning based on Theorem 4-6 and Deﬁnition 6-9.
• Usage: depUseRelation (Component1, Component2)
Returns: total dependency, partial dependency, or USE relation of Com-
ponent1 on Component2
We now show how to compare the robustness of diﬀerent designs from the
perspective of high level dependency tracking with two utility examples.
Example 6: In the original design, depUseRelation(CCls[i], LScc[i]) will
return the following:
• The dependency relation of CCls[i] on LScc[i] is: total dependency.
This is because in the original design, any failure of LScc[i], such as location
packet deadline miss or invalid location information (e.g., LocationError〈5,Inf〉),
will lead to the failure of CCls[i]. The component CCls[i] may miss its deadline
to provide location update to the other threads of the car controllers (e.g., CC-
cal[i], CCstop[i]), or provide location information with value error to the other
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threads who may then send out the wrong control command and ﬁnally lead to
System.Collision.
Example 7: In the enhanced design, depUseRelation(CCls[i], LScc[i])
will return the following:
• The dependency relation of CCls[i] on LScc[i] is: partial dependency.
The reason is that the Kalman ﬁlter installed at the site of car controller i
can tolerate a certain number of consecutive deadline misses of LScc[i], as well
as detect a too big value error (e.g., LocationError〈10,Inf〉) based on the model-
based state estimation. Therefore, the dependency strength measure of CCls[i] on
LScc[i] is only a nonempty proper subset of FSLScc[i].
Comparing the two query results of Example 6 and Example 7, we can see
that the dependency strength of component CCls[i] on component LScc[i] has
been weakened in the enhanced design.
Example 8: In both original design and enhanced design, depUseRela-
tion(CCstop[i], TMls[i]) will return the following:
• The dependency relation of CCstop[i] on TMls[i] is: USE.
Because CCstop[i] is in charge of detecting possible collision and directly issuing
a stop command in emergency to avoid collisions. No failure of TMls[i] (and
actually all other threads of trajectory manager) will lead to the malfunctioning of
CCstop[i]. But the component CCcal[i] depends upon TMls[i] in order to minimize
the trajectory following error.
We now have a brief discussion of the implementation issues. With respect
to the high-level dependency queries, the depend/USE relation between immedi-
ately interacting components have already been derived based on Deﬁnition 6-9
when the dependency speciﬁcation is loaded. Once the dependency reasoning en-
gine receives a depUseRelation query, it ﬁrst applies Theorem 4-6 to derive the
dependency of Component1 on Component2. If their dependency relation cannot
be uniquely determined through these composition rules, then the dependency
reasoning engine applies Deﬁnition 6-9 to determine the dependency relation,
where Theorem 1-3 are used to compose the system wide fault/failure propagation
properties. In this case, the impactAllFailures(Component2, Component1)
query (refer to Section 3.4.2) will be applied to determine the dependency strength
measure of Component1 on Component2 by exploring the impact of each failure of
Component2 on Component1.
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4.3.3 Checking of well-formed dependencies
As argued in Section 1.1, the most important system robustness criterion is that
critical components should only USE instead of depend on less critical ones. From
the fault propagation perspective, this implies that none of the failures of the less
critical components should be propagated, either directly or indirectly, to critical
components. If this is ensured in the system design, we say that the system design
has well-formed dependencies, otherwise, it has ill-formed dependencies (refer to
Deﬁnition 10 and Deﬁnition 11 in Chapter 2).
In the dependency speciﬁcation, each component has an annotated property
called Criticality. The higher the value of Criticality is, the more critical the com-
ponent is. If the dependency relation is ill-formed, i.e., some critical components
depend on less critical components, we say that there is dependency inversion. The
checking of dependency inversion is performed using the following query command.
• Usage: depInversion
Returns: all pairs of components in the system where a dependency inver-
sion occurs.
Now let’s demonstrate the utility of depInversion.
Example 9: We purposely change the criticality of VS to be lower than the
criticalities of the other most critical components. For example, the criticality of
the other most critical components to guarantee collision-free is set to 3, while the
criticality of VS is set to 2. The query command depInversion returns 2:
{PDEP : LSvs[3] , VS[2]};
{PDEP : LScc[3] , VS[2]};
{PDEP : CCls[3] , VS[2]};
{PDEP : CCstop[3] , VS[2]};
That is, according to the dependency management principle, the more critical
components LSvs, LScc, CCls and CCstop should not depend on the less critical
component VS. But in the actual design, such a dependency inversion exists. We
should have set the criticality of VS the same as the other most critical components
and aﬀord suﬃcient eﬀorts to improve its robustness.
When the users of our toolkit are alerted of the dependency inversion, they
should ﬁrst check whether there is a criticality speciﬁcation mistake, i.e., the crit-
icality of some component is mistakenly speciﬁed, which is the case of Example 9.
If there is no criticality speciﬁcation mistake, then fault masking or fault tolerance
2Note that the integer in the brackets is the criticality of the corresponding component,
not the index of the cars as illustrated in previous examples.
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mechanism should be enforced to cut oﬀ the failure propagation path from the less
critical component to the more critical component, and transform the dependency
relation to USE relation. This information is thus very instructive and helpful for
the developers to discover the potential dependency inversions and make the right
eﬀort to improve the robustness of the system. The lower-level dependency queries
of Section 4.3.1 will help to reveal fault/failure propagation path details.
We now have a brief discussion of the implementation issues. With respect
to the depInversion query, the underlying implementation simply explores all the
component pairs where Criticality(Component1) > Criticality(Component2), per-
forms the dependency query depUseRelation(Component1, Component2), and in-
cludes the pair in the returning set if the query result is total dependency or partial
dependency.
4.3.4 Comparison of robustness metrics
The software architects and developers need a robustness metric to compare the
robustness of two diﬀerent software designs for the same mission. First, we argue
that simply counting the edges of the call graph (in some papers, call graph is
simply referred as dependency graph) is not appropriate to serve the purpose of
robustness metric for a software system.
For a mission-critical software system, when we are talking about the robust-
ness of the system, we are always discussing it in the context of a certain mission-
critical requirement. That is, we are more concerned about what kind of failure
will bring down the whole system. In the DMF terminology, what kind of failures
will be transitively or hierarchically mapped to the system failure. Here we use the
term system failure, which is deﬁned as the failures of the union of all the compo-
nents that implements the mission critical requirements. For example, in the car
control testbed, the developers may want to investigate the system’s robustness
deﬁned as collision free, or as collision free and no fail-safe stop, or as collision free,
no fail-safe stop, and no trajectory following error. Obviously, with respect to ro-
bustness concerns of diﬀerent criticalities, there are diﬀerent robustness metrics.
Therefore, we have the following deﬁnition:
Definition 12: The robustness requirement of a robust real-time system is
denoted as: robustness = noFailure(Failure1, Failure2, etc).
The robustness metric is a subset of the union of all the components’ failure
semantics
⋃
(Compi, FSCompi) that can transitively or hierarchically lead to the
system-level failure Failure1, or Failure2, etc. We denote robustness metric of
the robust real-time system with respect to a certain design A as RMA.
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Given two designs A and B of the same robust real-time system, if RMA ⊂
RMB, we say that the robustness of the system in design A is higher than the
robustness of the system in design B.
We can get the robustness metric using the following query expression:
• Usage: robustnessMetric
Returns: robustness metric of the current system design with respect to
the speciﬁed robustness deﬁnition.
It should be pointed out that we measure and compare robustness based on
set theory instead of probability analysis. Therefore, our approach serves as a
complement to the traditionally used statistical robustness metric.
We now show how to compare the robustness of diﬀerent designs from the
perspective of robustness metric comparison with two utility examples. In the dis-
tributed car control testbed, suppose we deﬁne robustness = noFailure(Collision).
That is, only if no collision occurs, we say that the car control system is robust.
Recall that the CCstop is designed conservatively to tolerate a value diﬀerence
(e.g., 5 distance units) between the location information contained in the location
packet and the actual locations of the cars. That is, if CCstop discovers that
another car is within 5 distance units (+ the length of two cars and other similar
considerations) away from itself, a stop command will be sent out to the actuator
to avoid potential collisions. Therefore, in the old design of the car control testbed,
any location value error larger than 5 distance units may lead to car collision. But
in the new design, a Kalman ﬁlter is installed at the site of each car controller, and
a location value error larger than 10 distance units can be detected. The CCstop
can perform a fail-safe stop either when another car is within 5 distance units from
itself or when a location value error (larger than 10 distance units) is detected.
Example 10: In the original design, robustnessMetric will return the query
result RMold as:
{VS , LocationError〈5, Inf〉}
{LSvs , LocationError〈5, Inf〉}
...
{CCstop , UnableToDetect}
{CCstop , Crash}
Example 11: In the enhanced design, robustnessMetric will return the
query result RMnew as:
{VS , LocationError〈5, 10〉}
{LSvs , LocationError〈5, 10〉}
...
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{CCstop , UnableToDetect}
{CCstop , Crash}
In the above two robustness metrics, UnableToDetect and Crash are failures of
CCstop that can lead to car collision. The former is user-deﬁned and implies that
the thread CCstop’s collision detection algorithm fails to discover the situation
that another car is already too close to itself even when no value error exists in
the location packet. The latter is system-pre-deﬁned and implies that the thread
CCstop crashes (e.g., spin in inﬁnite loop, deadlock, thread crash) and is unable to
issue stop command to the cars even when possible collision has been detected.
Comparing the query results of Example 10 and Example 11, it is obvious to see
that RMnew ⊂ RMold, which implies that the new design has a higher robustness
than the old design.
When we deﬁne robustness = noFailure(Collision, FailSafeStop) or robustness
= noFailure(Collision, FailSafeStop, TrajectoryError), diﬀerent robustness metrics
will be returned by the query, and we can thus compare the two designs with
respect to these diﬀerent robustness concerns.
4.4 Real-time domain support of DMF
We target the application domain of DMF at robust real-time systems. In this sec-
tion, we will illustrate how DMF builds a bridge between the OS-layer dependency
relations and the APP-layer dependency relations, as shown in Figure 3.1.
4.4.1 Process/thread scheduling
We ﬁrst take schedulability analysis as an example. Schedulability analysis the-
oretically veriﬁes whether the tasks are schedulable under a certain scheduling
method (e.g., RM or EDF [39]). But only the schedulability analysis in theory is
not suﬃcient for the timing considerations in a robust real-time system. A ques-
tion that has to be asked is: What happens if a certain job overruns its budget
(i.e., estimated worst-case execution time)? Budget overrun (caused by inﬁnite
loop, deadlock, denial of service, etc) is highly possible if the execution time of the
job is not being monitored by the OS.
For example, consider a situation where a more critical component thread A
and a less critical component thread B share the same CPU, and the schedulability
analysis tells us that they are schedulable under EDF scheduling with respect to
their worst-case execution time. The problem is that it is highly possible that some
programming error, such as an inﬁnite loop or even a denial of service attack, make
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the component thread B overrun its budget. Then, under EDF, it is possible that
component thread A misses its deadline because it cannot get hold of the CPU
timely enough, unless there is OS support for budget monitoring. In this way, the
less critical component B indirectly causes a failure of the more critical component
A. The result is a dependency inversion because the critical component A now
depends on the less critical component B through resource sharing.
We have embedded in DMF the following domain dependency rules concern-
ing the budget overrun fault in real-time systems (a smaller schedPriority value
implies a higher scheduling priority) if no execution-time clock mechanism [29] is
implemented in the real-time operating system.
• A:Thread.BudgetOverrun → B:Thread.DeadlineMiss
if execTimeClock(OS) == false ∧ schedPolicy(APP) == SCHED FIFO ∧
schedPriority(A) <= schedPriority(B);
• A:Thread.BudgetOverrun → B:Thread.DeadlineMiss
if execTimeClock(OS) == false ∧ schedPolicy(APP) == SCHED RR ∧
schedPriority(A) < schedPriority(B);
• A:Thread.BudgetOverrun → B:Thread.DeadlineMiss
if execTimeClock(OS) == false ∧ schedPolicy(APP) == SCHED EDF;
Here, Thread is a DMF pre-deﬁned abstract component, and any application-
speciﬁc component corresponding to a thread can be declared as a subcompo-
nent of Thread using the extends key word (refer to Section 3.3.2). A:Thread
and B:Thread represent two variables of component type Thread, and will be
matched and replaced with any concrete subcomponent of Thread during depen-
dency tracking process. execTimeClock(OS) is an OS-layer design feature and
indicates whether the execution time clock mechanism, which is a RT-POSIX
standard [29], is implemented in the underlying real-time operating system. sched-
Policy(APP) is an APP-layer design feature. And int schedPriority (Thread A)
is a function corresponding to an application-speciﬁc design parameter, i.e., the
scheduling priority of a thread A.
SCHED FIFO is a ﬁxed priority preemptive scheduling policy, in which pro-
cesses with the same priority are treated in ﬁrst-in-ﬁrst-out (FIFO) order. SCHED RR
is similar to SCHED FIFO but uses a time-sliced (round robin) method to schedule
processes with the same priorities. Both of them are standard RT-POSIX speciﬁ-
cations. We also include SCHED EDF in case earliest deadline ﬁrst scheduling is
used in the application, even though it is not yet part of the standard.
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Once the user of DMF speciﬁes the features of the RTOS they are using,
the underlying DMF reasoning engine will automatically choose the appropriate
BudgetOverrun failure propagation rules which lead to DeadlineMiss failures of the
corresponding components. The reasoning process will continue from the Dead-
lineMiss failure of each aﬀected component based on the fault propagation rules
speciﬁed in the APP-layer by the user.
4.4.2 Process synchronization
Another example can be given concerning process synchronization. RT-POSIX
deﬁns three basic synchronization protocols: 1) NO PRIO INHERIT: the priority
of the thread does not depend on its ownership of mutexes (a mutex is owned
by the thread that locked it). 2) PRIO INHERIT: the thread owning a mutex
inherits the priorities of the threads waiting to acquire that mutex. This is the
priority inheritance protocol. 3) PRIO PROTECT: when a thread locks a mutex
it inherits the priority ceiling of the mutex, which is deﬁned by the application as
a mutex attribute. This is also known as the priority ceiling protocol. We have
the following domain dependency rules embedded in DMF:
• priorityInversion(A:Thread, B:Thread) = true
if synPolicy(OS) == NO PRIO INHERIT ∧
sharedMutex(A, B) =/= emptySet;
• failureSet(A:Thread) = addToFailureSet(failureSet(A), Lockup)
if synPolicy(OS) == PRIO INHERIT ∧
sharedMutex(A, B) == {M1:Mutex M2:Mutex} ∧ M1 =/= M2;
The ﬁrst rule says that if no priority inheritance protocol is implemented,
unbounded priority inversion may occur. The second rule says that if thread A
and thread B share two diﬀerent mutexes under the basic priority inheritance
protocol, deadlock may occur [39], and a Lockup failure is added to their failure
sets. The user will be alerted of this newly added failure, if it has not been foreseen
and has not been already included in the component’s failure set. The user should
thus go ahead to annotate how the Lockup failure of thread A will be propagated
to the neighboring components.
4.4.3 Clock resolution
To give another example, suppose the clock resolution for the RTOS is 10 ms. A
user speciﬁes that the sensing-control loop period of one process is 35ms. However,
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since the system cannot support this interval, it would, in reality, result in a loop
period of 40 ms instead. In such a situation, DMF will warn the user that the
actual period for component A will be 40 ms and will substitute period(A) with
40 ms wherever it occurs.
More generally, we have the following rule embedded in DMF:
period(A:Thread) = ceiling(period(A) / clockResolution(OS)) *
clockResolution(OS);
In summary, we have embedded the OS-layer domain dependency rules in
DMF based on the RT-POSIX standards. These general OS-layer dependency
rules and the speciﬁc APP-layer dependency rules are integrated, and the DMF
reasoning engine will perform dependency tracking on these rules, as illustrated
in Figure 3.1. However, the real-time domain support of the current DMF ver-
sion is still preliminary. To cover the full spectrum of RT-POSIX standard, the
examination and speciﬁcation of the following features are also desirable, includ-
ing timeout mechanisms, real-time signals, interrupt control, device driver control,
inter-process communication and shared resources. This has been pointed out as
one of the future research directions in Section 7.2.
DMF provides OS-layer dependency rules constrained by OS design features
(e.g., execTimeClock(OS), synPolicy(OS), clockResolution(OS)). The users of DMF
provide the actual value of the OS features of the RTOS they are using (e.g., exec-
TimeClock(OS) = false, synPolicy(OS) = PRIO INHERIT, clockResolution(OS)
= 10), and the DMF reasoning engine will then choose the corresponding fault
propagation rules to apply in the reasoning process.
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Chapter 5
Further Discussions of Several
Important Topics
5.1 A brief discussion of criticality
speciﬁcation of DMF
To make sure that dependencies are well formed and that critical services are pro-
tected from the faults and failures from less critical ones, the ﬁrst step is to separate
requirements into diﬀerent criticality levels. There are various methodologies to
assign criticalities to diﬀerent system requirements and software components. For
example, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) established DO-178B [4]
as the accepted means of certifying all new aviation software. The targeted DO-
178B certiﬁcation level is either A, B, C, D, or E. Correspondingly, these DO-178B
levels describe the consequences of a potential failure of the software: catastrophic,
hazardous-severe, major, minor, or no-eﬀect. The criticality of a software compo-
nents is then identiﬁed based on the criticality of the system requirement fulﬁlled
by the component to the overall safety of the system. Another more intuitive
classiﬁcation uses four criticality levels: 1) Safety critical, 2) Mission critical, 3)
Performance/feature enhancement, and 4) Optional. In the ION CubeSat for ex-
ample, the highest criticality level would be mission critical, i.e., the satellite is able
to communicate with the ground station. The event logging capability, however,
is just an optional feature. In DMF, we actually allow more ﬁne-grained criticality
levels. The criticality of each component is speciﬁed by an integer number. The
higher this integer number is, the more critical the corresponding component is.
Therefore, it is up to the users of DMF to decide how many criticality levels they
want to use when annotating the component criticalities.
Next, we make sure that requirements with diﬀerent criticality levels are allo-
cated to diﬀerent protected modules and to make sure that dependency relations
are well formed. We also need to track timing, functional and resource sharing
dependencies. This does not seem diﬃcult until we look at a real system, either
experimental or production. To complicate matters further, we sometimes ﬁnd
that the deﬁnition of critical depends on the mode of operation. For example, in
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the ION CubeSat, the bootloader is only critical during system bootup. After the
system has been successfully started, it becomes inactive. We also ﬁnd that some-
times a component will simultaneously belong to multiple criticality levels, which
is the case with the current ION CubeSat. This occurs in components that fulﬁll
both critical and non-critical functions. Although being able to assign criticalities
at the failure as opposed to component level would help to alleviate this problem,
the presence of such a situation really reveals a ﬂaw in the underlying design and
a lack of criticality separation.
The FAA’s DO-178B standard prohibits such criticality mix-ups, and a viola-
tion of the principle that requirements of diﬀerent criticalities should be assigned
to diﬀerent software components would not pass the FAA certiﬁcation process.
For a less critical software system such as ION, however, the users of DMF can
temporarily specify the criticality of a software component equal to the highest crit-
icality of the requirements realized by this component, if requirements of multiple
criticality levels are not separated and have been assigned to the same component.
But this indicates poor system design and requires architectural changes to make
dependency relations well formed.
In ION, for example, there is dependency inversion in the current design due to
either assigning requirements of multiple criticality levels to the same component
or unforeseen global fault propagation paths. With the aid of DMF, developers
will be alerted of the potential dependency inversions and all of the possible global
fault propagation paths. Based on this information, the developers should consider
restructuring the design until the dependency relations are well-formed. As a result
of following this process, system robustness is improved incrementally.
There is another point to be mentioned. DMF has a Pessimistic Annotation
Assumption: In DMF, we assume that pessimistic fault annotations are used. If
a developer cannot verify that a component is correct or if he does not know
the impact of a failure of another component providing a service to the current
component, he should annotate the most pessimistic potential faults. This style of
annotation may result in some false positive warnings to the user. However, this
also greatly reduces the possibility of false negative warnings. The extent to which
this should be done depends on the criticality of the system and the awareness of
the users. The Precautionary Principle adopted by FAA provides good guidance.
In 1999, in response to inquiries about the necessity of the ban of various electronic
devices during takeoﬀ and landing and neither should cellular telephones any time
during ﬂight, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) commissioned a
study to gather stronger evidence for or against the hypothesis that consumer
electronic devices interfere with aircraft functions. The study failed to ﬁnd any
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evidence of this interference. Nevertheless, the FAA ruled that, in the absence of
strong evidence of safety, the ban would continue in eﬀect. Most people agree that
the inconvenience of not being able to talk on the phone in ﬂight is oﬀset by even
a small risk of an airplane crash. Similarly, the users of DMF can also decide the
trade-oﬀ when annotating the fault propagation rules, between the inconvenience
of annotating all potential uncertain fault propagations and the risk in case of false
negative result.
5.2 A brief discussion of the scalability of
DMF
As argued in Chapter 1, modern real-time systems are often developed concurrently
by multiple teams. Each development team typically only knows and thus is
able to annotate the potential residual failures and failure propagation properties
among the software components within its own scope. They are also required to
understand and annotate how the failures of other teams’ components that directly
interact with their own components aﬀects them. But they are not supposed
to know the details of the fault/failure propagations of components exclusively
developed by other teams which they do not interact with. Therefore, system-
wide composition of the local dependency annotations must be supported in order
to guarantee the scalability of DMF.
In our framework, the term component can be deﬁned in diﬀerent layers or with
diﬀerent granularities. For example, it can be deﬁned in the function/procedure
layer, the class/module layer, or process/thread layer. The dependency analysis
and reasoning can be performed hierarchically from the components of lower layers
to components of higher layers to guarantee the scalability of the toolkit. In the
logical domain, at the ﬁnest granularity, we can ﬁrst investigate the fault/failure
propagation properties between functions that are used in one functionality module
(e.g., class in object-oriented programming), and derive the failure set of this spe-
ciﬁc functionality module based on the composition/interaction of these functions.
Then in the execution domain, we can investigate the fault/failure propagation
properties between the functionality modules that are used in one process/thread,
and derive the failure set of each execution unit (e.g., thread). Finally, we can
investigate the fault/failure propagation properties across process/thread bound-
aries, and reason about the robustness of the whole system. In this hierarchical
composition process, functions/classes and processes/threads are deﬁned as com-
ponent at diﬀerent stages.
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The ION CubeSat case study presented in Chapter 3 tracks the dependency
relations between diﬀerent classes, while the distributed car control testbed case
study presented in Chapter 4 tracks the dependency relations between diﬀerent
threads. Another case study on Etherware middleware [15] tracks the dependency
relations between diﬀerentfunctional modules.
In detail, the hierarchical dependency management process can be performed
as follows:
• Each development team speciﬁes the fault/failure propagation and compo-
sition rules among the components (e.g., in the function/procedure layer)
developed by themselves, and derive the potential failure set of the function-
ality module (e.g., in the class/module layer) within its scope based on the
composition rules.
• Each development team sends the potential failure set of the modules within
its scope and the speciﬁcation of fault/failure propagation rules where the
modules within its scope are destination components (e.g., in the class/module
layer) to a centralized higher-level development manager or development
team leader.
• The higher-level development manager or development team leader reasons
about the potential failures and robustness of the system in the next higher
layer (e.g., in the process/thread layer) based on the information sent by all
the lower-level teams and annotates the appropriate fault propagation rules
for this layer.
• This dependency tracking process can be done iteratively until the system
layer is reached and a complete set of fault propagation rules for each layer
exists.
For example, the car control system has been developed by four people, each
one in charge of vision server, location server, trajectory manager, and car con-
troller separately. According to the hierarchical dependency management process
presented above, each person can ﬁrst perform dependency tracking and reason-
ing among the C functions within his own scope, and derive the failure sets for
each functionality module within his scope (e.g., the model-based state estimation
module, the control command calculation module, and the collision detection and
avoidance module in car controllers). Then each person sends the derived poten-
tial failure set and the speciﬁed fault/failure propagation rules where the module
within his scope is the destination component to the development team leader.
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The development team leader then reasons about the system robustness based on
the information collected from all the four developers.
The formally derived and implemented dependency composition rules of DMF,
i.e., Theorem 1-6 of Chapter 2, enable its scalability. Only the failure propagations
between immediately interacting components need to be speciﬁed. Furthermore,
only failure propagations regarding the conjunctive composition of basic failure
types are required. The global system-wide failure propagation properties and
dependency relations can be composed from the local annotations of failure prop-
agation based on the fault/failure propagation theorems and depend/USE relation
propagation theorems. In addition, since most updates and ﬁxes occur at the low-
est layer, once the fault propagation rules for the process/thread and system layers
are deﬁned, they will rarely change.
However, it has to be pointed out that it is not an easy job to keep the depen-
dency speciﬁcations consistent among all development teams. For example, even
though DMF has a system-deﬁned key word Crash for crash failure, and Dead-
lineMiss for deadline miss failure etc, some users may prefer to use fCrash and
fDeadlineMiss instead. This is ﬁne provided that fCrash and fDeadlineMiss are
used consistently among all the development teams. However, if team A chooses
to use fCrash and team B chooses to use Crash (or self-deﬁned failCrash), and
they are not informed of this inconsistency by each other, problem may occur.
The A.fCrash failure will not be matched to the left side of the failure propagation
rule A.Crash → B.*** even though semantically they should have been matched.
Thus an existing failure propagation path is overlooked due to inconsistency of
dependency speciﬁcations among the teams.
In general, this is a multiple model consistency problem, which is very hard to
tackle with in reality.
In Chapter 14 Maintaining Model Integrity of his book [27], Eric Evans writes:
We need ways of keeping crucial parts of the model tightly uniﬁed. None of this
happens by itself or through good intentions. It happens only through conscious de-
sign decisions and institution of speciﬁc processes. Total uniﬁcation of the domain
model for a large system will not be feasible or cost-eﬀective...
Even a single team can end up with multiple models. Communication can lapse,
leading to subtly conﬂicting interpretations of the model. Older code often reﬂects
an earlier conception of the model that is subtly diﬀerent from the current code...
When a number of people are working in the same bounded context, there is
a strong tendency for the model to fragment. The bigger the team, the bigger the
problem, but as few as three or four people can encounter serious problems. Yet
breaking down the system into even smaller contexts eventually loses a valuable
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level of integration and coherency.
The solution to this unavoidable tendency of inconsistency among multiple
speciﬁcations is more of an organizational matter than technical matter, as Eric
Evans writes in his book [27]: Institute a process of merging all code and other
implementation artifacts frequently, with automated tests to ﬂag fragmentation
quickly. Relentlessly exercise the ubiquitous language to hammer out a shared view
of model as the concepts evolve in diﬀerent people’s heads.
5.3 A brief discussion of the evolvability of
DMF
When a new component is added to the system, the DMF user only needs to
specify this component’s criticality, failure set, and fault propagation rules con-
cerning immediately interacting components. When a component is removed from
the system, the DMF user simply removes the declaration for this component and
its criticality. When a component is updated or replaced, the user only needs to
update the corresponding criticality, failure set, and fault propagation rules con-
cerning immediately interacting components. In short, when the system design
evolves, the scope of the re-speciﬁcation is local and isolated from the other com-
ponents which are not immediately interacting with the updated component. In
this way, the evolvability of the dependency speciﬁcation is guaranteed, and DMF
does not burden its users.
However, there is another issue that is more critical and diﬃcult to tackle with,
i.e., the software artifact correspondence problem. It is easy to specify various
properties or invariants, such as using consistent units, in architecture and design
documents. How to ensure source codes compliance with architecture speciﬁcation
is a major scientiﬁc and technological challenge in software producibility.
In the context of DMF toolkit, it would be perfect if the dependency speciﬁ-
cation can be synchronously updated as the system implementation (source code)
is changed. Put it in another way, it would be ideal if the component interaction
and failure propagation rules speciﬁed in the dependency speciﬁcation ﬁle (or an-
notations if the dependency speciﬁcation is embedded in the source code) exactly
correspond to the ever changing software system implementations.
However, this ideal goal is too ambitious to achieve without manual eﬀort
involved. The majority of software system design properties cannot be directly
extracted by statically analyzing the source code, e.g., the metric system units
implicitly used, the Kalman ﬁlter delay tolerance in the distributed car control
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testbed. These design properties either have to be explicitly speciﬁed or can only
be obtained through oﬀ-line experimentation. Similarly, most failure propagation
rules can only be explicitly speciﬁed by the domain expert or the developer of the
speciﬁc software modules. There are techniques trying to automatically generate
these fault propagation rule by data mining or fault injection [12, 13, 25, 32]. But
they can only generate a small subset of possible failure propagation rules.
Another cause of the inconsistency between dependency speciﬁcations and sys-
tem implementations is the reluctance of the developers to go back and revise the
dependency speciﬁcation after they make changes to the source ﬁles. This leads
to the fact that the dependency speciﬁcation will sometimes be out-of-dated when
the implementation is constantly modiﬁed and improved.
In general, the solution to the notoriously diﬃcult software artifacts corre-
spondence problem is rather more organizational than technical. As Eric Evans
writes [27]: It is essential to have some process of continuous integration.
Continuous integration means that all work within the context is being merged
and made consistent frequently enough that when splinters happen they are caught
and corrected quickly. Continuous integration, like everything else in domain-
driven design, operates at two levels: (1) the integration of model concepts and (2)
the integration of the implementation.
Concepts are integrated by constant communication among team members. The
team must cultivate a shared understanding of the ever-changing model...Meanwhile,
the implementation artifacts are being integrated by a systematic merge/build/test
process that exposes model splinters early.
Even though it is impossible to totally automatically generate the dependency
speciﬁcations out of the implementation, even though manual eﬀort has to be
involved, we argue that it is a worthwhile eﬀort to manually keep consistency be-
tween dependency speciﬁcation and system implementations. First of all, we claim
that just the eﬀort of annotating the criticality, failure set, and failure propaga-
tion rules of a system helps developers to be more aware of the system’s failure
propagation behaviors and be alerted to some failures or propagations overlooked
before. Then, with the aid of DMF’s Dependency Query Commands, DMF will
further assist the developers in checking whether the system design has well-formed
dependencies. DMF will also help the users to discover the best placed to enforce
fault tolerance and masking mechanisms to improve the robustness of the system.
In addition, DMF allows developers to examine their system as a whole and de-
termine which components are interacting and which components can result in
critical failures. This knowledge can then be used to focus debugging and testing
eﬀorts on components in the critical path.
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Even though it is impractical to totally solve this software artifact correspon-
dence problem, or tight binding between speciﬁcation and implementation problem
in our terminology, DMF proposes a partial solution trying to urge the user to
enforce the consistency between dependency speciﬁcation and system implemen-
tations.
Our solution consists of two main strategies. First, DMF allows the user to
specify the source ﬁles associated with one or more failure propagation rules. Each
time the dependency speciﬁcation is reloaded, the underlying DMF parser will
check whether the latest modiﬁcation date/time of the associated source ﬁles are
more recent than that of the dependency speciﬁcation ﬁle. If it is, a warning
will be shown to the user, and the user is alerted to look into the speciﬁc failure
propagation rules to see whether they are still valid after the modiﬁcation of the
source ﬁles.
Second, DMF enables parameterized failure semantics and conditional failure
propagation rules where the condition is a boolean expression of software design
properties, failure semantics parameters, etc. In this way, when the software design
changes, the DMF user only needs to update the values of the corresponding
software design properties in the component property values section or the
interaction property values section of the dependency speciﬁcation. The
tool will then automatically apply the correct failure propagation rules in the
dependency reasoning. This has been demonstrated in Section 4.2.
Notice that this is one form of tight binding in design layer: (1) DMF real-
izes the tight binding between failure and component, i.e., each failure is bound
with a component, and each failure propagation rule is bound with a destination
component; (2) DMF realizes the tight binding between dependency speciﬁcation
and software system design properties, i.e., each failure propagation rule can be
speciﬁed as conditional upon a boolean expression of system design properties.
The tight binding discussed in this speciﬁc section is the software artifact corre-
spondence problem, i.e., the binding between system design properties and system
implementation properties. That is, the dependency speciﬁcations, the failure
propagation rules, and the system design properties are desired to be up-to-date
with the constantly changing system implementations (source ﬁles). As we said,
this has to involve manual eﬀort and is more of an organizational matter than
technical matter as pointed out in [27].
In a word, there are two layers of tight binding here. One is the binding
between system design and system implementation, for which we have a
partial solution. The other is the binding between dependency specification
and system design (e.g., components, interactions, design properties), for which
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DMF has a suﬃciently strong support.
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Chapter 6
Related Works
6.1 Related works in dependency
management
In addition to Cristian’s work( [16,17]) on dependency management in distributed
systems, there are a lot of researches conducted in this area. In this chapter, we list
several representative works that target diﬀerent goals and aspects of dependency
management and fault analysis.
Kon et al. [34] classify dependencies between software components into two
categories: prerequisite and dynamic dependencies between loaded components
in a running system. Their goal is to implement software components that can
conﬁgure themselves and adapt to the highly dynamic environments. Our focus is
the fault/failure containment and propagation analysis and dependency tracking,
thus the dependency classiﬁcation and management mechanisms are fundamentally
diﬀerent between Kon’s work and ours.
Keller et al. [33] introduce the concept of dependency strength, which is de-
ﬁned as how strongly the dependent component depends on the antecedent re-
source. They classify dependency strength into none, optional, and mandatory.
While none simply states that there is no interaction between the two components
at all, optional and mandatory seem similar with our USE and depend. However,
they did not provide further explanation nor a formally deﬁned measure of depen-
dency strength. Our classiﬁcation of dependency strength extends their informal
notions by providing a formally deﬁned strength measure and the notion of failure
semantics mapping.
The problem how to acquire the dependency information is another crucial
issue in dependency management, although this is not fully within the scope of
this thesis. Brown et al. [12] apply active perturbation, i.e., injecting faults in a
controller manner and observing the behavior of the components, to identify and
characterize dynamic dependencies between system components in distributed ap-
plication environments such as e-commerce systems where their dependency graph
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is unknown or partially known. Kar et al. [32] present a pragmatic repository-
based approach to generate appropriate service dependency information from the
system conﬁguration repositories. Ensel [25] presents an approach applying arti-
ﬁcial neural networks to automatically determine whether two real world objects
have a relationship or not over time. In our work, we view dependency from the
perspective of robustness criterion, i.e., fault/failure propagation across compo-
nent boundaries and the well-formed dependency checking. Our tool can evaluate
system-wide dependency relations from local annotations. However, with respect
to the local annotations, it is the developer’s responsibility to annotate the fault
propagation properties within his scope, i.e., among the components developed by
his own development team and the immediately interacting components developed
by other teams. Currently, our tool is not able to automatically acquire this kind
of information without the user’s annotations.
Ensel et al. [26] describes an approach for applying XML, XPath, and RDF
to the problem of describing, querying, and computing the dependencies among
services in a distributed computing system. A key contribution of this paper is a
web-based architecture for retrieving and handling dependency information from
various managed resources. Alda et al. [10] present a component architecture
FREEVOLVE. Hasselmeyer [30] provides a dependency management architecture
based on Jini technology. Their application domain is application service over
service provider networks or peer-to-peer networks and they try to provide a de-
pendency management middleware. While these works focus on implementing
a dependency management middleware to integrate with the running system in
software operation phase, we are more concerned about developing a uniﬁed the-
oretical framework and implementing a prototype toolkit to aid the developers to
improve the system robustness primarily in software design phase.
Nett et al. [42] identify managing dependencies as a basic problem for the design
of fault-tolerant algorithms, and cope with this problem by the speciﬁcation and
realization of a distributed dependency management systems. Realized as a generic
software tool, it can be used as a customizable component that eases the design and
implementation of existing and future algorithms. Their work is concerned about
the fault-tolerant algorithms, while our work is concerned about the fault-tolerant
systems.
The concept of operational proﬁles [41] in software reliability engineering can
be properly integrated into our framework, helping us have a clear picture of the
possible failures and failure handling mechanisms. Since operational proﬁle is
concerning a set of disjoint operational alternatives with the probability that each
will occur, they are more useful in statistical analysis of the system dependability.
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Our theoretical framework is analytical instead of statistical.
6.2 Related works in fault analysis
Many diﬀerent types of fault analysis have been proposed and are in use. Some
diﬀer primarily in their names, whereas others truly have unique and important
characteristics. In Chapter 14 of Safeware: System Safety and Computers [37],
Nancy Leveson presents a detailed overview of the basic features, the life-cycle
phase to which it applies, and a brief evaluation of each major fault analysis
techniques. Below is a list of the fault analysis techniques discussed in [37]:
• Checklists
• Hazard indices
• Management oversight and risk tree analysis
• Event tree analysis
• (Software) fault tree analysis
• Cause-consequence analysis
• Hazards and operability analysis
• Interface analysis
• Failure modes and eﬀects analysis
• Failure modes, eﬀects, and criticality analysis
• Fault hazard analysis
• State machine hazard analysis
• Task and human error analysis techniques
Among them, the technique most related to our research is software fault tree
analysis. Fault tree analysis [36–38,47] has been widely used in system reliability
studies, oﬀering the ability to focus on an event of importance and work to mini-
mize its occurrence or consequence. When changes are infrequent, e.g., a hardware
system, the fault tree analysis is very eﬀective in analyzing system reliability or
safety issues. However in constantly changing software systems, lack of explicit
binding between the tree structure and the actual system design makes it hard
to keep track design changes, as illustrated in Figure 1.3. While in our work, the
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importance of tight binding between the dependency speciﬁcation and software
system designs has been adequately addressed in the following way:
• Each failure semantics is tightly bound to the component it belongs to (in
the general form B.FSSB → A.FSS
′
A , i.e., map(FS
S
B, B,A) = FS
S
′
A ), thus
we are able to reason about the fault/failure propagation across component
boundaries. In software fault tree analysis, however, the notion of compo-
nent boundary is blurred, because the fault/event is more of a high level
abstraction in view of the whole system than of a speciﬁc failure explicitly
attached to a certain component.
• The dependency expression (i.e., failure propagation rules) is a function
of the annotated properties of components and their interaction protocols.
That is, there is a tight binding between the actual design of software compo-
nent interactions and the failure propagation descriptions. Therefore, once
the software design parameters change, the underlying DMF reasoning en-
gine will automatically update the failure propagation rules that should be
applied in dependency tracking, and automatically generate the fault/failure
propagation or dependency tracking query results upon query submissions.
The International Society for Automotive Engineers (SAE) has produced Ar-
chitecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) [5], which is a textual and
graphical language supporting model-based engineering of embedded real-time sys-
tems and has been approved and published as SAE Standard AS-5506 by SAE in
November 2004. AADL has an Error Model Annex that extends the core lan-
guage to support reliability modeling. The MetaH toolset [6] of Honeywell, the
starting point for the AADL standard, has shown that AADL is a very useful
architecture description language for error modeling. To the best of our knowl-
edge, AADL/MetaH is the best toolkit for error modeling and analysis up to date,
considering its standard modeling language and analysis capabilities.
Malcolm Wallace describes a modular representation and compositional anal-
ysis of a system’s hardware and software components, called Fault Propagation
and Transformation Calculus (FPTC) [48]. He shows, given an architectural de-
scription of how components are combined into a whole system, together with an
FPTC expression of each component’s failure behavior, how the failure properties
of the whole system can be computed automatically from the individual FPTC
expressions. From a safety point of view, this provides some idea of robustness:
the system’s capability to withstand certain types of failures in individual com-
ponents. It also provides a way to understand how and where to develop fault
accommodation within an architecture.
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The objective and accomplishments of [48] are quite similar with our De-
pendency Management Framework from the ﬁrst glance. However, the building
block of FPTC is the statically schedulable code unit, which represents a single
sequential thread of control. The basic connection between units are therefore the
communication protocols between these threads. While with DMF, the building
block is much more ﬂexible, as discussed in Section 5.2 and demonstrated by the
ION CubeSat case study (refer to Chapter 3), where the building block of the
dependency speciﬁcation is a class in object-oriented programming paradigm.
Comparing to AADL/MetaH and FPTC, our toolkit has several distinctive
characteristics. Like our work, AADL/MetaH and FPTC also addresses the bind-
ing between failures and the associated components, more or less. Yet the tight
binding between dependency expressions (i.e., fault/failure propagation rules) and
the software system designs has not been fully addressed. Therefore, like software
fault tree analysis, AADL/MetaH and FPTC is also not capable to keep track of
the software design changes when fault analysis is performed.
In addition to the tight binding, DMF also enables parameterized failure se-
mantics, which AADL/MetaH, FPTC or software fault tree analysis do not of-
fer. As shown by the application examples in Chapter 4, parameterized failure
semantics signiﬁcantly enriches the fault propagation model. For example, in
AADL/MetaH, FPTC or software fault tree analysis, it is diﬃcult to express the
following fault propagation property: When the number of consecutive location
packet deadline misses exceeds k (k is not a constant but a variable that should
be updated when software design or environment changes), there is a fail-safe stop
failure of car controllers.
We now perform a comparison of the toolkit functionalities. In the query root-
Cause(Component, Failure), the Component.Failure is like the top event of the
fault tree, and the automatically generated root-cause failure set together with
the propagation paths can be looked as a textual representation of the graphical
representation in fault tree. That is, we can do what software fault tree does in
backward analysis. We can also perform forward analysis, as AADL/MetaH and
FPTC can do. Besides these low-level dependency tracking features, our toolkit
also supports high-level dependency (total depend/partial depend/USE) tracking,
which is very important to make a mission-critical system robust, i.e, to ensure
essential services in spite of faults and failures in useful but non-essential compo-
nents. High-level dependency tracking and well-formed dependency checking are
not supported in software fault tree analysis, FPTC or AADL/MetaH.
With respect to the quantitative analysis, i.e., the quantiﬁcation of the proba-
bility of occurrence of a failure, our toolkit does not support the statistical analysis,
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which is an important feature in fault tree analysis and AADL/MetaH. However,
we argue that numbers for probability of software faults are not yet as available as
hardware in practice. But it should be pointed out that we measure and compare
robustness based on set theory instead of probability analysis. Therefore, our ap-
proach serves as a complement to the traditionally used statistical dependability
metric, as used in fault tree analysis and AADL/MetaH.
Currently, DMF does not support dependency composition expressions similar
to dynamic fault tree gates, such as Priority-AND, Sequence-Enforcing, and Cold-
Spare, which we think are common in hardware systems but not quite typical in
software systems.
Notice that in addition to the DMF toolkit, we also formalize a uniﬁed the-
oretical framework for dependency management, where concepts such as failure
semantics and dependency strength and composition rules for both high-level and
low-level dependency relations have been formally deﬁned or derived. The deﬁ-
nitions and theorems in the theoretical framework serves as the solid theoretical
foundation of the underlying dependency reasoning engine. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst time that such a uniﬁed theoretical framework for de-
pendency management is provided.
Finally, it must be pointed out that dependency tracking, like fault tree analy-
sis, is limited to the tracking and analysis of the propagation of potential faults and
failures under a given fault model. They cannot be used to detect if a component
has internal defects, which is the task of proof of correctness, model checking [24]
and testing.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future
Research Directions
7.1 A brief summary of accomplishments
In this thesis, we have provided a theoretical framework as well as a many-featured
prototype toolkit dedicated to dependency tracking and reasoning in robust real-
time systems. The current accomplishments are summarized as below:
Theoretical Framework of DMF [20,21]:
1. We extend the traditional failure semantics to parameterized failure seman-
tics, which enables application-speciﬁc software failure semantics speciﬁca-
tions.
2. We provide the formal deﬁnition of dependency strength based on the notion
of failure semantics mappings, and classify the dependency relation into
three categories: Total Depend, Partial Depend, and USE.
3. We formally derive transitive and hierarchical composition rules for both
high level dependency relation tracking and low level failure propagation
reasoning based on the deﬁnitions.
Prototype Toolkit of DMF [19,21]:
1. The dependency speciﬁcation language of DMF is simple and expressive, e.g.,
it supports component inheritance, Boolean expressions of failure propaga-
tion rules, and parameterized failure semantics and dependency expressions.
2. The dependency query commands of DMF support both high-level depen-
dency queries (dependency inversion check) and low-level dependency queries
(the detailed failure propagation path resulting in dependency inversion).
3. We suﬃciently address the challenges of scalability and evolvability by only
asking the users to specify the failure propagation properties between im-
mediately interacting component.
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We have done several case studies to test the usability and scalability of
DMF, i.e., the ION CubeSat [19], the convergence lab’s distributed car control
testbed [21], the Etherware middleware [15], and eSimplex testbed [20].
In addition to these papers on dependency management, this author has other
three papers on fault-tolerance software architectures [22, 23, 40]. The ﬁrst two
papers deal with software reliability in view of formal speciﬁcation and validation
based upon Actor model [9] and Real-Time Maude [7,31]. The third paper focuses
on co-design of control and schedulability. The case studies in these three papers
are performed on the eSimplex system [45,46].
7.2 Future research directions
There are a bunch of interesting and challenging research topics to continue this
work. We summarize them into 10 future research directions.
1. The real-time domain support of the current version of DMF is rather pre-
liminary. It only covers very basic scheduling and resource sharing failures
and failure propagation rules. However, there are plenty of challenging re-
search directions concerning real-time domain-speciﬁc dependency manage-
ment. For example: (1) Timing dependency. The late arrival of expected
message may cause the failure of a loop and cascade into other loops. Modern
software frequently uses indirect communication methods such as publication
and subscription service oﬀered by middleware. The ability to automatically
track and see the timing dependency of a complex distributed real-time sys-
tem is important. (2) Resource sharing dependencies. This includes the
shared use of (2.1) Hardware resources such as CPU, memory, I/O channels
and specialized devices. This should be handled by dependency tracking
and integrate it with schedulability analysis; (2.2) Software library, OS and
middleware services. This requires static analysis to track and to ensure
rules of usages are enforced. It also requires fault injection tests for the eﬃ-
cacy of fault containment mechanisms; (2.3) Run time checks for faults that
cannot be eliminated by testing and static analysis. This requires detailed
fault modeling and analysis so that we know which one must be checked at
runtime.
2. Dependency management for distributed systems. This will bring up a lot
of interesting research issues speciﬁc to distributed and networked systems.
The support for dependency management in distributed systems of the cur-
rent version of DMF is still pretty naive, even though we have done case
74
studies on the dependency management of the distributed car control testbed
and Etherware middleware.
3. Further improvement of the user-friendliness of DMF - such as a more
user-friendly graphical user interface, and a better syntax parser for the
dependency speciﬁcation language. A viable platform to implement this
is Eclipse [8], which has formed an independent open eco-system around
royalty-free technology and a universal platform for tools integration.
4. Integration with other tools to, at least partially, automatically generate
fault propagation paths. At this point, the dependency tracking procedure
depends on the correct annotation of fault propagation relations among com-
ponents by developers. However, at least some of these relations could be
derived automatically, for example, by exploiting the fault injection tech-
niques.
5. Support for more complex Boolean operators, including dynamic Boolean
expressions such as priority AND (the output occurs if and only if all input
events occur in a particular order, but the input events are not constrained
to occur in this particular order), and sequence-enforcing (the output occurs
if and only if all input events occur in a particular order, and the input events
are constrained to occur in this particular order). These dynamic Boolean
operators, in addition to the traditional AND/OR Boolean operators, will be
very useful for dynamic dependency tracking and management in run-time,
which is listed as the next research direction.
6. Run-time dependency tracking and management. The current version of
DMF is designed for dependency tracking and management at design and
development time. A run-time dependency tracking and management frame-
work would be very helpful for debugging, fault diagnostics, and fault recov-
ery. A middleware may be implemented to integrate with well-know fault
tolerance techniques. Take fault recovery for example, given a component
failure that has been observed, the DMF user can perform root cause anal-
ysis to determine which components possibly lead to this failure, and then
only the identiﬁed components are recovered, say by restarting the process.
A recovery decision and management middleware will be implemented to in-
teract with DMF and identify the minimal subset of components that should
be recovered in order to minimize MTTR (mean time to recovery). This can
be completed on top of Process Resurrection [35], work done by another
RTSL group member, Kihwal Lee.
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7. Further theoretical framework - the most ambitious goal may be deriving the
domain-speciﬁc dependency relation composition and propagation theorems
in a similar fashion of our six general theorems as presented in Chapter 2.
Notice that a solid theoretical foundation is an indispensable part of the
research in order to make the prototype toolkit theoretically sound.
8. Dependency annotations embedded in the source code, or even extracted
from the source code. This part is very challenging and need further in-
vestigation on its feasibility because we have to then set up a programming
paradigm for the DMF users if they want to make use of such a feature. But
then users may be reluctant to change their programming habit to adapt to
our speciﬁc tool.
9. Security and dependency management. Robustness cannot be totally de-
tached from security concerns. This is a very promising and interesting
future research topic.
10. Statistical analysis or even simulation of failure propagation behaviors. That
is, given the failure rate of each component, how to estimate the probability
for a certain system-level failure to occur within a certain period of time? Or
what’s the availability and reliability of the system? Can we do a simulation
purely on the fault propagation behaviors?
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